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INTRODUCTION 
According to federal health and census data, addiction treatment is 
expected to be a $42 billion industry in 2020.1 It has doubled in size since 
2003 when it was a $21 billion business.2 The opioid crisis has fueled the 
growth of the industry by increasing the demand for residential drug 
treatment programs3 and sober living homes.4 The industry has also become 
less fragmented in recent years with the infusion of capital from investors 
eager to consolidate web sites, call centers, rehabilitation facilities, drug-
testing labs, and sober living homes under one corporate roof.5 
Astronomical growth of an industry, however, often invites bad actors. 
 
1. Teri Sforza, Addiction Treatment: The New Gold Rush. ‘It’s Almost Chic,’ ORANGE COUNTY 
REG. (June 16, 2017, 5:13 PM), https://www.ocregister.com/2017/06/16/addiction-treatment-the-new-g 
old-rush-its-almost-chic/ [https://perma.cc/32QV-2D3H].  
2. Id.  
3. Residential drug treatment centers provide 24-hour structured and intensive care that 
includes, inter alia, safe housing and counseling. See infra Part II. 
4. Sober living homes are utilized by patients recovering from addiction. It is a supervised, 
drug-free living environment. See infra Part II. 
5. Sforza, supra note 1 (explaining that in the past addiction treatment centers were “small 
mom-and-pop enterprises, which leaves tremendous room for consolidation and efficiencies. Unifying 
small centers into larger networks spreads administration costs over larger revenue bases, while more 
sophisticated operations can allow for investment in technology and data-mining that may better manage 
health and financial outcomes.”).  
In 2014, a rehab chain called American Addiction Centers went public on the New York Stock 
Exchange, attracting investments from the likes of Morgan Stanley and BlackRock. Mergers 
and acquisitions related to drug and alcohol addiction programs doubled between 2013 and 













Bad actors have swarmed the residential drug treatment industry. One 
prominent example is Kenny Chatman, who ran several treatment centers 
and sober living homes in South Florida.6 His goal was not to help addicts 
become sober.7 Instead, his facilities encouraged drug use and prolonged 
treatment so that he could collect insurance reimbursements.8 Further, his 
centers ordered drug-addicted patients to provide urine samples for 
fictitious patients so that he could continue to collect insurance payments.9 
In total, he collected at least $16 million in reimbursements from insurance 
companies for treatment that was never aimed at helping his patients 
overcome their addiction.10 In 2017, Chatman pled guilty to federal charges 
of health-care fraud, money laundering, and human trafficking.11 He was 
sentenced to twenty-seven years in prison.12 After the case, two hundred 
additional sober homes were shut down in Florida.13 But, that was just the 
tip of the iceberg. Indeed, the crackdown in Florida simply encouraged 
fraudulent treatment centers to relocate to other states.14  
Chatman was able to defraud patients and insurance companies due to 
insufficient regulation in the residential drug treatment industry. There is a 
lack of uniformity amongst the states concerning the accreditation and 
licensing requirements to open and maintain a residential drug rehabilitation 
facility. Some states have adopted the standards of care put forth by the 
National Alliance for Recovery Residences (NARR).15 Others have adopted 
standards put forth by the American Society of Addiction Medicine 
 
five years.  
Julia Lurie, “Mom, When They Look at Me, They See Dollar Signs,” MOTHER JONES (Mar./Apr. 2019), 
https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2019/02/opioid-epidemic-rehab-recruiters/ [https://perma. 
cc/U7HD-7VZ2]. 
6. Scott Cohn, Opioids’ Hidden Epidemic—Fraudulent Drug Treatment Centers, CNBC (June 
29, 2018, 10:06 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/06/opioids-hidden-epidemicfraudulent-drug-treat 
ment-centers.html [https://perma.cc/J9P2-KCA9]. 







14. Tony Saavedra, Florida Prosecutor Dave Aronberg Sees Parallels in Rogue Rehabs in 
Florida and Southern California, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Mar. 27, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.ocregi 
ster.com/2018/03/27/florida-prosecutor-dave-aronberg-sees-parallels-in-rogue-rehabs-in-florida-and-s 
outhern-california/ [https://perma.cc/QWD7-8AYV]. 
15. NARR is a non-profit organization that has a “mission . . . to support persons in recovery 
from addiction by improving their access to quality recovery residences through standards, support 
services, placement, education, research and advocacy.” NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR RECOVERY RESIDENCES, 
www.narronline.org [https://perma.cc/KPF6-GABT]. 












(ASAM).16 Nevertheless, there are still many states that do not have 
standards of care that govern the operation of residential drug treatment 
centers. Fraudulent treatment centers, like the ones run by Chatman, thrive 
in these states. It is very difficult for a consumer to know whether they are 
going to a legitimate treatment facility or a fraudulent one.  
This Article deals with fraudulent practices in the residential drug 
treatment industry. It will principally focus on the two related issues of 
quality of care and patient brokering. With respect to quality of care, this 
Article will address fraud and overutilization as well as poor care. The 
Mental Health Parity Act and the Affordable Care Act expanded coverage 
for residential drug treatment.17 As with other medical expenses, insurance 
companies cover the costs of drug rehabilitation on a traditional fee-for-
service basis. Relapses,18 which are a normal part of recovery,19 are also 
covered.20 Importantly, health insurance plans cover urinalysis to test for 
drugs as an essential service, with a very low deductible.21 Unfortunately, 
unethical treatment centers, like those run by Chatman, are not incentivized 
to provide cost efficient and effective care. To the contrary, their incentives 
are to drag out treatment for as long as possible and rack up insurance 
claims. Some treatment centers charge insurance companies $1,000 or more 
per drug test and test patients repeatedly to ensure a steady stream of income 
for the treatment center.22 This practice constitutes overutilization. Other 
 
16. What Is the ASAM Criteria?, AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED., https://www.asam.org/Quality-
Science/the-asam-criteria/about [https://perma.cc/C4P6-JPH7]. 
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. Relapse occurs when you have a period of sobriety followed by a period of resumed 
substance use. 
19. “Treatment of chronic diseases involves changing deeply rooted behaviors, and relapse 
doesn’t mean treatment has failed. When a person recovering from an addiction relapses, it indicates 
that the person needs to speak with their doctor to resume treatment, modify it, or try another treatment.” 
NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUGS, BRAINS, AND BEHAVIOR: THE SCIENCE OF ADDICTION 23, https:/ 
/d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/soa.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8GP-XLK8]. 
20. Dave Aronberg, Opportunists Are Exploiting the ACA to Prey on Opioid Addicts, TIME (Sept. 
20, 2017), https://time.com/4950199/affordable-care-act-opioid-relapse/ [https://perma.cc/6TVV-27C 
9] (“Together, the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 and the ACA ensure that drug 
relapse is always covered as an essential health benefit and cannot be excluded due to a pre-existing 
condition, and that children remain on their parents’ policies until age 26. This has provided a financial 
incentive for rogue providers to keep patients of all ages in a cruel cycle of rehab.”). Prior to the 
Affordable Care Act, drug abuse with recent treatment was considered a pre-existing condition for which 
insurers could decline coverage. Gary Claxton et al., Pre-Existing Condition Prevalence for Individuals 
and Families, KFF: HEALTH REFORM (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/pre-
existing-condition-prevalence-for-individuals-and-families/ [https://perma.cc/4CAT-G6SN]. 
21. The ACA requires that laboratory testing be included as an essential benefit. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18022(b)(1)(H) (2018). 













treatment centers charge insurance companies for drug tests or other 
services that were never performed, which is fraud.23  
In addition, unethical treatment centers are involved in patient brokering, 
a practice whereby they recruit drug addicts with health insurance into their 
programs by offering everything from low rent to prepaid debit cards as 
incentives for participating.24 Patients often search for residential drug 
treatment centers on the internet.25 After finding a treatment center, they call 
the number listed on the internet believing that they are contacting a 
residential treatment center.26 In reality, they are often calling patient 
brokers who misrepresent themselves on the internet as treatment centers.27 
Once the patient brokers convince a patient to receive treatment at a 
disreputable residential drug treatment center, they often transport patients 
hundreds of miles to the fraudulent providers. Patient brokers then receive 
kickbacks from the treatment centers for directing patients to their centers.28 
The problem, however, is that the patients do not receive the care that they 
need to beat their addiction to drugs.29 And, once the insurers get wind of 
the fraud, they cease payments and the addicted patients are left untreated 
hundreds of miles from home.30 Further, some addiction treatment centers 
are associated with sober living homes where they send their patients after 
addiction treatment.31 Some treatment centers have gone so far as to offer 
drugs to residents of sober living houses to make them relapse and start the 
treatment, or rather billing, cycle all over again.32 In short, unethical 
treatment centers are using the opioid epidemic as a means of exploitation 
for financial gain. Addiction treatment has become a multi-billion-dollar 
industry chiefly fueled by pee in a cup—Liquid Gold.  
 
23. Insurance Fraud, ETHICS TREATMENT, http://ethicsintreatment.com/insurance-fraud/ [https:/ 
/perma.cc/T6U3-8RPM]. 
24. John Pacenti, Patient Brokering: A Festering Wound for Recovery Community, PALM BEACH 
POST (Oct. 29, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/local/patient-brokering-festeri 
ng-wound-for-recovery-community/hTxetVZpPd2Lud2kV4evoM/ [https://perma.cc/KJ8V-5Z6A]. 
25. Cat Ferguson, Searching for Help, VERGE (Sept. 7, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.c 
om/2017/9/7/16257412/rehabs-near-me-google-search-scam-florida-treatment-centers [https://perma.c 
c/5JT7-C68P] [hereinafter Ferguson, Searching for Help]. 
26. Id.  
27. Id. 
28. Pacenti, supra note 24. 
29. See infra Part III.A.1. 
30. See infra Part III.A.1. 
31. Susan Taylor Martin, Addicts Say Recovery Program Stole Their Money, TAMPA BAY TIMES 
(Nov. 19, 2012), https://www.tampabay.com/news/addicts-say-recovery-program-stole-their-money/12 
61911/ [https://perma.cc/8KF2-NNWS]; Teri Sforza et al., How Some Southern California Drug Rehab 
Centers Exploit Addiction, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (May 21, 2017, 5:55 AM), https://www.ocregister.co 
m/2017/05/21/how-some-southern-california-drug-rehab-centers-exploit-addiction/ [https://perma.cc/T 
Z94-PYYR].  
32. Martin, supra note 31; Sforza et al., supra note 31. 
 












The lack of regulation in the residential drug treatment industry is 
practically an invitation for deceptive business practices such as patient 
brokering, insurance fraud, and substandard care. While many scholars have 
written articles addressing the opioid crisis and the best way to address it, 
this is the first article to address the corruption in the residential drug 
rehabilitation market. This Article argues that the government must address 
the crisis in the residential drug treatment industry with national legislation.  
Part I addresses the diagnosis of substance and opioid use disorders. It 
also focuses on the origins of the opioid crisis. Part II addresses the types of 
treatment available for substance and opioid use disorders with a particular 
focus on residential drug treatment centers and sober living homes. Part II 
also examines the impact that expanded insurance coverage for substance 
use disorder (SUD) treatment has had on the drug rehabilitation market. 
Specifically, it argues that expanded coverage for SUD has motivated bad 
actors to enter the residential drug treatment market to exploit vulnerable 
patients and insurance companies. Part III examines fraud in the residential 
drug rehabilitation market. It sets forth the schemes that disreputable 
residential drug treatment centers utilize to defraud patients and insurers. In 
addition, it critiques the model of treatment at residential rehabilitation 
facilities that is based on abstinence and support groups. It argues that to 
ensure quality care, residential rehabilitation facilities must utilize 
evidence-based treatment and hire professionals with specialized training in 
addiction medicine.  
Part IV employs the economics of information to understand the inability 
of consumers to choose a reputable treatment center. It argues that the 
quality of residential drug treatment centers is difficult to assess due to 
severe informational asymmetries in the residential drug treatment market. 
Part IV also examines the significant costs associated with fraudulent 
treatment centers such as decreased productivity, which leads to foregone 
earnings from employment, and higher costs to the criminal justice system 
due to an increase in opioid-related crime.33 And, more importantly, an 
increase in the mortality rate because patients do not receive effective care 
at fraudulent treatment centers that places a huge burden on families and the 
economy in general due to lost potential earnings.34  
Parts V–VII explore three proposals to address the fraud and lack of 
quality care in the drug rehabilitation industry. Part V concentrates on the 
recently passed federal opioid legislation that prohibits patient brokering. It 
 
33. WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE UNDERESTIMATED COST OF THE OPIOID 















argues that the federal legislation banning patient brokering is an important 
first step in addressing the fraud in the residential drug treatment market. 
The federal legislation does not, however, completely solve the problem. 
The legislation does not ensure quality care by mandating the use of 
evidence-based treatment. Nor does it correct the information asymmetry in 
the market by providing information on quality to consumers.  
Part VI examines a proposal to abandon fee-for-service billing in the 
residential drug treatment market and replace it with outcome-based 
reimbursement that could properly account for the quality of the residential 
drug treatment center. Part VI finds that instituting outcome-based 
reimbursement has the potential to reward the best residential drug recovery 
centers and remove financial incentives currently in place for unethical 
centers. Nevertheless, it will be difficult to accurately define and assess 
quality health care. And, it will likely be an administrative headache to 
implement. Further, it fails to provide objective information about quality 
directly to vulnerable patients. It only provides that information to insurance 
providers. The success of this solution in addressing information 
asymmetries would rely upon insurance providers sharing quality 
information with consumers. Further, there is very little evidence that 
suggests that outcome-based reimbursement changes provider behavior or 
patient outcomes.  
Finally, Part VII sets forth the author’s proposal to adopt mandatory 
federal accreditation and licensing requirements for residential drug 
treatment centers and sober living homes. Part VII argues that mandatory 
federal accreditation of facilities and licensing of providers is necessary to 
ensure quality care and provide needed information to consumers. Federal 
accreditation standards should require that treatment centers provide 
evidence-based treatment and adhere to minimum standards of care. 
Licensing requirements must require specialized training in addiction 
medicine to enable counselors to utilize evidence-based treatment. Federal 
accreditation will promote transparency into the quality of residential drug 
treatment centers and sober living homes nationwide. Further, it will make 
it easier to keep disreputable residential drug treatment centers and sober 
living homes out of the market. This Article concludes that federal 
intervention through mandatory accreditation and licensing is the most 
effective way to solve the informational asymmetry in the market and 
ensure quality care.  













A. Substance and Opioid Use Disorders 
Millions of Americans suffer from substance use disorder.35 The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), published 
by the American Psychiatric Association (APA), is the standard 
classification of mental disorders in the United States.36 According to DSM-
5, SUD occurs when the recurrent use of alcohol and/or drugs causes 
clinically and functionally significant impairment, such as health problems, 
disability, and failure to meet major responsibilities at work, school, or 
home.37 SUD leads to changes in brain circuitry which may cause 
behavioral effects such as “repeated relapses and intense drug craving when 
the individuals are exposed to drug-related stimuli.”38 To diagnose SUD, a 
trained clinician would look for evidence of impaired control, social 
impairment, risky use, and other pharmacological criteria.39 In total, there 
are eleven symptoms associated with SUD.40 For a clinician to diagnose a 
patient with SUD, the patient must meet the criteria for at least two or more 
symptoms.41 
Although Americans who suffer from SUD may abuse many types of 
drugs, opioids have taken center stage in the prescription drug abuse 
problem. Opioids are synthetic drugs42 that have been manufactured to 
resemble the natural pain-relieving characteristics of opiates derived from 
the opium poppy.43 Opioids bind to the body’s opioid receptors, which are 
 
35. AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., OPIOID ADDICTION: 2016 FACTS & FIGURES 1 (2016), https 
://www.asam.org/docs/default-source/advocacy/opioid-addiction-disease-facts-figures.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/3C72-7CL5] (noting that of the 20.5 million Americans with SUD in 2015, 2 million were 
addicted to prescription pain medicine and 591,000 were addicted to heroin). 
36. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
(DSM-5) (5th ed. 2013). 
37. Id. at 482–83. 
38. Id. at 483. 
39. Id. at 483–84.  
40. Id.  
41. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 36, at 484. A clinician would also assess the severity 
of the SUD from mild (2-3 symptoms) to moderate (4-5 symptoms) to severe (6+ symptoms). Id.  
42. Synthetic drugs, as opposed to natural drugs, are chemically produced in a laboratory. 
Their chemical structure can be either identical to or different from naturally occurring drugs, 
and their effects are designed to mimic or even enhance those of natural drugs. When produced 
clandestinely, they are not typically controlled pharmaceutical substances intended for 
legitimate medical use.  
LISA N. SACCO & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42066, SYNTHETIC DRUGS: OVERVIEW 
AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2016) (footnote omitted), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42066.pdf [https:/ 
/perma.cc/V7ER-XUJR]. 
43. Alanna Guy, A Surging Drug Epidemic: Time for Congress to Enact a Mandate on Insurance 













found in areas of the brain that control pain and emotion.44 When opioid 
drugs bind to these receptors, they can drive up dopamine levels in the 
brain’s reward circuit, producing a state of euphoria and relaxation.45 
Common prescription opioids on the market include Percocet, Oxycodone, 
Vicodin, and Methadone.46 Typically, doctors prescribe opioids to treat 
acute or chronic pain, as well as pain caused by a terminal illness.47 
Unfortunately, prescription opioids are highly addictive drugs because they 
produce euphoria in addition to pain relief. Thus, even patients who take 
opioids by prescription can become dependent48 on them or misuse them.49  
There are many physical and functional consequences associated with 
opioid use. People on opioids may suffer from severe constipation, 
impairment of visual acuity, and dry mouth and nose.50 If an individual 
injects opioids, she may suffer from track and puncture marks on the lower 
portions of her arm.51 If an individual sniffs heroin or other opioids into the 
nose, she may develop irritation of the nasal mucosa or even perforation of 
the nasal septum.52 Further, after prolonged use, men can suffer from 
 
J.L. & HEALTH 5, 6 (2018). “Opium itself can be extracted from the opium poppy and contains chemical 
compounds, including morphine and codeine. Thus, examples of opiates are morphine and codeine.” 
Stephanie Labonville, Opiate, Opioid, Narcotic – What’s the Difference?, INJURED WORKERS 
PHARMACY (Mar. 29, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.iwpharmacy.com/blog/opiate-opioid-narcotic-what 
s-the-difference [https://perma.cc/3MN7-YK4M].  
44. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUG FACTS: UNDERSTANDING DRUG USE AND ADDICTION 
2 (2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/understanding-drug-use-addiction [https:// 
perma.cc/H4B2-ETA8] [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING DRUG USE]. 
45. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 19, at 5. Surges of dopamine in the brain’s reward 
circuit cause repetition of behavior. Id. at 17 (“Just as drugs produce intense euphoria, they also produce 
much larger surges of dopamine, powerfully reinforcing the connection between consumption of the 
drug, the resulting pleasure, and all the external cues linked to the experience. Large surges of dopamine 
‘teach’ the brain to seek drugs at the expense of other, healthier goals and activities.”). “As a person 
continues to use drugs, the brain adapts by reducing the ability of cells in the reward circuit to respond 
to it. This reduces the high that the person feels compared to the high they felt when first taking the 
drug—an effect known as tolerance.” UNDERSTANDING DRUG USE, supra note 44, at 2. The person 
might take more of the drug to obtain the high they felt when first taking the drug. Id. Long-term use 
also affects functions such as learning, judgment, decision-making, stress, memory, and behavior. Id. 
46. Guy, supra note 43, at 6.  
47. Id. 
48. “Drug dependence occurs with repeated use, causing the neurons to adapt so they only 
function normally in the presence of the drug. . . . Some chronic pain patients are dependent on opioids 
and require medical support to stop taking the drug.” NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUG FACTS: 
PRESCRIPTION OPIOIDS 3 (2019), https://d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/drugfacts-pres 
criptionopioids.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4E5-4AZD]. 
49. Id. at 1. Misuse of a prescription drug refers to taking the drugs in a manner or dose other 
than what the doctor prescribed, taking medications that the doctor prescribed for someone else, or taking 
the medicine for the purpose of getting high. Id. “[R]epeated misuse of prescription opioids can lead to 
a substance use disorder (SUD) . . . .” Id. at 4. 
50. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 36, at 544. 
51. Id. (explaining that “[v]eins sometimes become so severely sclerosed that peripheral edema 
develops, and individuals switch to injecting in veins in the legs, neck, or groin”). 
52. Id. at 545. 












erectile dysfunction and women can suffer from disturbances of 
reproductive function.53 
Opioid use disorder involves “compulsive, prolonged self-administration 
of opioid substances that are used for no legitimate medical purpose or, . . . 
doses greatly in excess of the amount needed for [a] medical condition.”54 
For individuals with opioid use disorder, life is often “planned around 
obtaining and administering opioids.”55 Patients with opioid use disorder 
may attempt to obtain opioids from a physician by falsifying or 
exaggerating medical symptoms or by obtaining multiple prescriptions from 
several physicians. In addition, patients may attempt to purchase opioids on 
the illegal market.56 When patients misuse opioids, it can lead to addiction,57 
overdose incidents, and deaths.58  
When addicted patients can no longer obtain prescription opioids, they 
sometimes turn to illicit opioids such as heroin59 and fentanyl60 because they 
 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 542. The diagnostic criteria for opioid use disorder include at least two of the following 
within a twelve-month period: (1) opioids taken in greater amounts or for longer periods than intended; 
(2) persistent desire for opioids or unsuccessful efforts to control opioid use; (3) spending a great deal 
of time to obtain, use, or recover from the opioids; (4) craving to use opioids; (5) opioid use interfering 
with ability to fulfill major obligations at home, school, or work; (6) opioid use in the face of recurrent 
social problems caused by opioid use; (7) abandoning or reducing important social, occupational, or 
recreational activities due to opioid use; (8) continued opioid use in physically hazardous situations; (9) 
continued opioid use despite physical or psychological problems caused by opioids; (10) tolerance; and 
(11) withdrawal. Id. at 541.  
55. Id. at 542.  
56. Id. 
57. “Addiction is a chronic disease characterized by drug seeking and use that is compulsive, or 
difficult to control, despite harmful consequences.” UNDERSTANDING DRUG USE, supra note 44, at 1.  
58. Opioids, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids [htt 
ps://perma.cc/RES8-F7F4] (click on “Summary”). 
59. “Heroin is a poisonous, illegal substance made from morphine, which has no legal medicinal 
use. It is typically a powdery substance that can vary from white to dark brown in color. Heroin . . . is 
most commonly used by mixing it with water and injecting it into the body.” Guy, supra note 43, at 11 
(footnotes omitted). Heroin provides an “almost immediate ‘rush,’ or brief period of intense euphoria, 
that wears off quickly and ends in a ‘crash.’ The individual then experiences an intense craving to use 
the drug again to stop the crash and reinstate the euphoria.” NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES 
OF DRUG ADDICTION TREATMENT: A RESEARCH-BASED GUIDE 26 (3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter NAT’L 
INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES].  
60. “Fentanyl is a powerful synthetic opioid that is similar to morphine but is 50 to 100 times 
more potent.” Fentanyl, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Feb. 2019), https://d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.ne 
t/publications/drugfacts/fentanyl [https://perma.cc/X372-UAL8]. Non-pharmaceutical fentanyl is sold 
as powder, spiked on blotter paper, mixed with or substituted for heroin, or as tablets that mimic other, 
less potent opioids. DRUG & CHEM. EVALUATION SECTION, DIVERSION CONTROL DIV., DRUG ENF’T 
ADMIN., ACETYL FENTANYL 1 (2020), http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drug_chem_info/acetylfenta 
nyl.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G6V-6J6E]. Fentanyl’s effects resemble those of heroin and include euphoria, 
drowsiness, nausea, confusion, constipation, sedation, tolerance, addiction, respiratory depression and 













are more easily obtainable and less expensive than prescription opioids.61 
Heroin and fentanyl are good substitutes for addicted patients because they 
interact with the brain reward circuit in the same way as prescription 
opioids.62  
Because opioids have the potential for abuse or “psychological or 
physical dependence,”63 the federal government regulates the manufacture, 
distribution, and use of prescription and illicit opioids through the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA).64 Through the CSA, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) is able to regulate the lawful 
production and distribution of opioids and prevent diversion65 of lawfully 
obtained opioids from legitimate purposes.66  
In addition, the CSA imposes penalties for unauthorized activities 
involving opioids.67 Through registration requirements, the CSA creates a 
system where lawful distribution may only occur among registered handlers 
of controlled substances.68 Under the CSA, registrants are required to keep 
complete and accurate records of all transactions involving controlled 
substances.69 Further, they are required to report “every sale, delivery, 
disposal, or dispensing of any controlled substance.”70 Pursuant to the CSA, 
only licensed medical practitioners may prescribe controlled substances to 
 
61. Valarie K. Blake, Engaging Health Insurers in the War on Prescription Painkillers, 11 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 491–92 (2017). 
62. Id. (explaining that four out of five heroin addicts were first addicted to prescription opioids).  
63. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45164, LEGAL AUTHORITIES UNDER THE 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO COMBAT THE OPIOID CRISIS, at Summary (2018), https://fas.org/sgp 
/crs/misc/R45164.pdf [https://perma.cc/YU6N-5SCQ]. 
64. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2018). 
65. “The DEA has explained that the term ‘diversion,’ used in the context of the CSA, refers to 
‘the redirection of controlled substances which may have lawful uses into illicit channels.’” YEH, supra 
note 63, at 1 n.6. (quoting Controlled Substances Quotas, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,784 (July 16, 2018) (to be 
cofidied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1303)). 
66. Id. at 1.  
The CSA imposes specific obligations on registrants in an effort to reduce the potential 
diversion of controlled substances out of legitimate distribution channels. In particular, the CSA 
imposes legal duties relating to (1) recordkeeping by registrants, (2) measures ensuring the 
secure storage of controlled substances handled by registrants, (3) reporting certain information 
to the DEA, (4) prescribing and dispensing controlled substance medications by registered 
doctors and pharmacists, and (5) the quantity of controlled substance that may be produced by 
manufacturers.  
Id. at 10–11 (footnote omitted). 
67. Id. at 1. 
68. Id. (explaining that “drug manufacturers, wholesale distributors, exporters, importers, health 
care professionals, hospitals, pharmacies, and scientific researchers” must register with the DEA and 
keep records concerning their inventories and the distribution thereof).  
69. “For example, a registrant must make a complete and accurate record of each substance 
manufactured, received, sold, delivered, or otherwise disposed of by the registrant.” Id. at 11 (citing 21 
U.S.C. § 827(a)(3) (2018); 21 C.F.R. § 1304.21(a) (2018)). 
70. Id. at 12 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 827(d) (2018)). 












patients, and the prescription must be “issued for a legitimate medical 
purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his 
professional practice.”71  
Unfortunately, a key contributor to drug abuse and addiction is diversion 
due to a registered entity’s failure to comply with the requirements of the 
CSA.72 This type of diversion can typically be seen in “pill mills”73 where 
practitioners liberally prescribe opioids in the absence of a legitimate 
medical need.74 It can also be found where manufacturers fail to report 
suspicious orders of controlled substances.75  
B. The Opioid Crisis 
At any given time, there are around 100 million adults in the United 
States suffering from chronic pain.76 Pain management is incredibly 
important because it has a huge impact on patient physiology and quality of 
life.77 There has long been a concern in the medical community that treating 
chronic pain patients with morphine or other opioids would lead to tolerance 
and addiction.78 Thus, physicians were hesitant to use opioids to treat 
chronic pain. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, specialists in palliative care 
began to use opioids to provide relief to terminal patients.79 At the same 
time, the World Health Organization (WHO) included opioids in its cancer 
pain treatment guidelines and recognized that pain treatment was a 
 
71. Id. at 14 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a)(1) (2018)). 
72. Id. at 2. 
73. “The difference between pill mills and legitimate pain specialists is the volume of patients 
seen, prescriptions written, and limited medical exams. Most only accept cash payments.” Brian Krans, 
More ‘Pill Mill’ Doctors Prosecuted Amid Opioid Epidemic, HEALTHLINE (May 19, 2016), https://www. 
healthline.com/health-news/pill-mill-doctors-prosecuted-amid-opioid-epidemic#1 [https://perma.cc/6N 
UV-MZ52]. 
74. YEH, supra note 63, at 2. 
75. Id. at 35 (quoting Pub. L. No. 115-271, § 3272(a), 132 Stat. 3895, 3952 (2018)). 
76. D. Andrew Tompkins, J. Greg Hobelmann & Peggy Compton, Providing Chronic Pain 
Management in the “Fifth Vital Sign” Era: Historical and Treatment Perspectives on a Modern-Day 
Medical Dilemma, 173 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE (SUPPLEMENT) S11, S12 (2017). Chronic pain 
is pain that has persisted for more than three months. Id. at S11. 
77. As Yaksh and Wallace explain in Goodman & Gilman’s the Pharmacological Basis of 
Therapeutics: 
Failure to adequately manage pain can have important negative consequences on physiological 
function, such as autonomic hyperreactivity (increased blood pressure, heart rate, suppression 
of GI motility, reduced secretions); and reduced mobility, leading to deconditioning, muscle 
wasting, joint stiffening, and decalcification; and can contribute to deleterious changes in the 
psychological state (depression, helplessness syndromes, anxiety). 
Tony Yaksh & Mark Wallace, Opioids, Analgesia, and Pain Management, in GOODMAN & GILMAN’S 
THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 355, 379 (13th ed. 2018). 














“universal right.”80 In the 1990s, there was a heightened focus on pain 
management. There was a sense that patients with pain were not receiving 
the care that they needed.81  
The American Pain Society (APS) began its “Pain, The Fifth Vital Sign” 
campaign, which argued that patients were undertreated because pain was 
not regularly assessed at hospitals or physician offices.82 During the 
campaign, opioids were described as a potential treatment option for pain 
patients.83 The campaign also emphasized the need to reexamine the use of 
opioids for chronic pain and to improve quality at end of life.84 The 
campaign was funded in large part by opioid manufacturers.85 Former APS 
president, Dr. Russell Portenoy, has “admitted to overstating claims for the 
safety and effectiveness of opioids in order to break down what he regarded 
as unwarranted resistance within the medical profession to prescribing 
them.”86 Purdue Pharma then paid Portenoy to help drive sales of 
OxyContin.87 Ultimately, the Fifth Vital Sign campaign was very 
successful, and by the late 1990s it was well recognized that patients should 
be assessed and treated for pain.88  
The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
(Joint Commission)89 also made the treatment of pain a top priority.90 It 
 
80. Id. 
81. Brian F. Mandell, The Fifth Vital Sign: A Complex Story of Politics and Patient Care, 83 
CLEVELAND CLINIC J. MED. 400, 400 (2016). 
82. Id. Vital signs are objective clinical measurements that indicate the state of a patient’s 
essential body functions which include: pulse rate, temperature, respiration rate, and blood pressure. 
Pain, on the other hand, is a “subjective feeling that is impossible to accurately and consistently quantify 
across patient populations.” Myles Gart, Pain Is Not the Fifth Vital Sign, MED. ECON. (May 20, 2017), 
https://www.medicaleconomics.com/medical-economics-blog/pain-not-fifth-vital-sign [https://perma.c 
c/S86S-5ZBR].  
83. Tompkins, Hobelmann & Compton, supra note 76, at S13. 
84. Id. 
85. Chris McGreal, US Medical Group that Pushed Doctors to Prescribe Painkillers Forced to 




88. Tompkins, Hobelmann & Compton, supra note 76, at S13. 
89. The Joint Commission is an independent, not-for-profit organization that accredits and 
certifies health care organizations and programs in the United States. Facts About the Joint 
Commission, JOINT COMMISSION, https://www.jointcommission.org/about-us/facts-about-the-joint-co 
mmission/ [https://perma.cc/LGQ8-4TC7]. It is the “oldest and largest standards-setting and accrediting 
body in health care.” Id. It accredits over 22,000 health care organizations and programs in the United 
States. Id. Health care organizations accredited by the Joint Commission must abide by the Joint 
Commission standards in order to get reimbursed for care provided to Medicare and Medicaid patients. 
Hospital Accreditation and Certification Options, JOINT COMMISSION, https://www.jointcommission.or 
g/accreditation-and-certification/health-care-settings/hospital/learn/accreditation-options-certifications/ 
[https://perma.cc/7KSY-2SBX]. 
90. The Joint Commission first issued its standards on pain management in 2001. These 
standards, as they currently stand, are as follows: 












conditioned the receipt of federal health care dollars for accredited health 
care settings on the assessment and treatment of pain for all patients.91 
Because pain is subjective, however, providers needed to ascribe a 
numerical value to the pain to properly assess it.92 This led to the creation 
of the zero to ten pain scale.93 In response to the Joint Commission’s pain 
assessment and treatment requirement, many hospitals liberalized the use of 
opioids and physicians were encouraged to “use opioids to control pain 
quickly and as completely as possible.”94 Importantly, however, the Joint 
Commission’s pain assessment and treatment requirement did not 
recommend or even mention opioids. Although the American Pain Society’s 
Fifth Vital Sign campaign became conjoined with the Joint Commission’s 
2001 pain assessment and treatment standards, the Joint Commission 
maintains that it “does not endorse pain as a vital sign” and that this is not 
part of the accreditation standards.95 Further, it states that its accreditation 
 
Our foundational standards are quite simple. They are: 
• The hospital educates all licensed independent practitioners on assessing and 
managing pain. 
• The hospital respects the patient’s right to pain management. 
• The hospital assesses and manages the patient’s pain. 
Requirements for what should be addressed in organizations’ policies include: 
1) The hospital conducts a comprehensive pain assessment that is consistent with its 
scope of care, treatment, and services and the patient’s condition. 
2) The hospital uses methods to assess pain that are consistent with the patient’s age, 
condition, and ability to understand. 
3) The hospital reassess and responds to the patient’s pain, based on its reassessment 
criteria. 
4) The hospital either treats the patient’s pain or refers the patient for treatment. Note: 
Treatment strategies for pain may include pharmacologic and nonpharmacologic 
approaches. Strategies should reflect a patient-centered approach and consider the 
patient’s current presentation, the health care providers’ clinical judgment, and the 
risks and benefits associated with the strategies, including potential risk of 
dependency, addiction, and abuse.  
Clemens, Joint Commission Statement on Pain Management, ANESTHESIA EXPERTS (Apr. 25, 2016), htt 
ps://anesthesiaexperts.com/uncategorized/joint-commission-statement-pain-management/ [https://perm 
a.cc/KR5H-8Z7C].  
91. “The . . . standards require that organizations establish policies regarding pain assessment 
and treatment and conduct educational efforts to ensure compliance.” Press Release, Joint Comm’n, 
Clarification of April 13, 2016, Statement on Pain Management from David W. Baker (Apr. 18, 2016), 
https://jointcommission.new-media-release.com/2016_statement/downloads/April_2016_Pain_Statem 
ent.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MBY-DFK7]. The Joint Commission notes, however, that the standards 
“d[id] not require the use of drugs to manage a patient’s pain.” Matthew Perrone, Painkiller Critics Take 
Aim at Hospital Surveys, Procedures, AP NEWS (Apr. 13, 2016), https://apnews.com/a48f0d9556c3442 
394da1f5b44e01692 [https://perma.cc/EN6C-4KL5] (quoting the Joint Commission). 
92. Gart, supra note 82. 
93. Id. 
94. Tompkins, Hobelmann & Compton, supra note 76, at S14. 













standards “advocated for an individualized patient-centric approach” to pain 
rather than reliance on a pain score. 96 
While pain was being touted as the Fifth Vital Sign, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers were aggressively marketing opioids for pain. In 1995, the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Purdue Pharma’s drug 
OxyContin, a time-released version of oxycodone, for the treatment of 
moderate to severe pain.97 From 1996 to 2001, Purdue Pharma aggressively 
marketed OxyContin as less addictive than other opioids.98 Purdue 
Pharma’s own studies, however, showed that patients became addicted to 
OxyContin and suffered from withdrawal symptoms when they stopped 
using it.99 The marketing campaign was incredibly successful. From 1997 
to 2002, the number of prescriptions for Oxycontin went from 670,000 to 
6.2 million.100 OxyContin, however, was not the only opioid that had a sharp 
increase in prescriptions in the 1990s and 2000s. Indeed, the number of 
prescriptions for all opioids increased during that time.  
The Fifth Vital Sign campaign, aggressive marketing of opioids, and 
liberal prescribing policies all contributed to the opioid crisis. More than 2.5 
million Americans suffer from opioid use disorder.101 In 2014, there were 
28,000 overdose deaths attributed to opioids.102 As a result of the opioid 
crisis, many more Americans are seeking treatment for substance and opioid 
use disorder.  
II. SUBSTANCE AND OPIOID USE DISORDER TREATMENT 
This Part discusses the treatment options for individuals suffering from 
substance or opioid use disorder. While the focus of the Article is on 
residential drug rehabilitation facilities and sober living homes, there is a 
continuum of treatment services for SUD patients. As individuals recover 
 
96. Id. 
97. Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing Opioid Misuse and 
Abuse, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-drug-class/timeline-selecte 
d-fda-activities-and-significant-events-addressing-opioid-misuse-and-abuse [https://perma.cc/2DZ8-JU 
UR] (last updated Dec. 20, 2019). 
98. Katrice Bridges Copeland, The Crime of Being in Charge: Executive Culpability and 
Collateral Consequences, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799, 821 (2014) (explaining that Purdue Pharma 
“claimed that intravenous abuse was more difficult with OxyContin, that it created less risk of addiction 
than immediate release opioids, that patients would not develop a tolerance to the drug or experience 
withdrawal symptoms, and that it caused less euphoria than immediate-release opioids”). 
99. Id. 
100. Tompkins, Hobelmann & Compton, supra note 76, at S14. 
















from SUD, they move through the range of services and sometimes need to 
transition to care that is greater or less intense, depending on their needs. 
For example, a SUD patient might begin at a detoxification center and then 
move to a residential drug rehabilitation program or an intensive outpatient 
care facility. Alternatively, a SUD patient might begin with outpatient care 
and realize that more intense care is needed and transition to a residential 
rehabilitation facility.  
This Part also examines the role of public and private insurance in paying 
for treatment. Specifically, it addresses the expansion in coverage for SUD 
treatment due to the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 
and the ACA and its impact on the drug rehabilitation industry. 
A. Treatment Options 
Detoxification, or medically supervised withdrawal, focuses on the 
elimination of substance use.103 Detoxification services use both medical 
and clinical procedures to assist patients as they withdraw from the effects 
of substance abuse.104 Detoxification is only the first step of treatment.105 If 
a patient only receives detoxification services, it is unlikely that the patient 
will achieve long-term abstinence from drug use. 
The Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000106 permits physicians to treat 
opioid use disorder with narcotic medications. Medication-assisted 
treatment (MAT),107 as it is called, is the use of medications with counseling 
and behavioral therapies to treat SUD and prevent opioid overdose. Opioid 
treatment programs (OTPs) provide MAT for individuals diagnosed with 
opioid use disorder. OTPs must be accredited and certified by the Substance 
 
103. Treatment Options, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. (Oct. 2019), htt 
ps://findtreatment.gov/content/treatment-options/what-happens-next [https://perma.cc/SNF7-XE6R]. 
104. Id. 
105. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, UNDERSTANDING DRUG ABUSE AND ADDICTION: WHAT 
SCIENCE SAYS 24, https://www.drugabuse.gov/node/pdf/1921/understanding-drug-abuse-and-addiction 
-what-science-says [https://perma.cc/2LEP-BH7D] (last updated Feb. 2016). 
106. Pub. L. No. 106-310, 114 Stat. 1222 (2000) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(g), 
824 (2018)). The DATA expands access to patients by permitting certified physicians to prescribe FDA-
approved drugs to treat opioid use disorder without being affiliated with a specialized treatment clinic. 
NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, MEDICATIONS TO TREAT OPIOID USE DISORDER 6, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/node/pdf/21349/medications-to-treat-opioid-use-disorder [https://perma.cc 
/ADN3-M4WA] (last updated June 2018) [hereinafter NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, MEDICATIONS]. 
107. Unlike rehabilitation facilities, the use of MAT is heavily regulated and requires accreditation 
standards and certification processes. Medication-Assisted Treatment: Statutes, Regulations, and 
Guidelines, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., https://www.samhsa.gov/programs-campaigns/medication-assisted-treatment/legislation-regul 













Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.108 Approximately 10 
percent of all treatment facilities offer OTPs.109 
The medications used to treat opioid use disorder are opiate agonists,110 
partial agonists,111 and antagonists.112 Methadone, for example, is a 
synthetic opioid agonist that has been used for more than forty years to treat 
opioid use disorder.113 Studies have found methadone to be effective at 
reducing opioid use.114 Buprenorphine is a partial opioid agonist and has 
been found to be as “effective as methadone for treating opioid use 
disorders.”115 Although individuals who do not suffer from opioid use 
disorder could get high on methadone or buprenorphine because they 
interact with the brain’s opioid receptors, the effect on individuals who 
suffer from opioid use disorder is to minimize withdrawal116 symptoms and 
cravings. Patients who are treated with methadone or buprenorphine can 
“function normally, attend school or work, and participate in other forms of 
treatment or recovery support services to help them become free of their 
substance use disorder over time.”117 Naltrexone is an opioid antagonist that 
is used to prevent opioids from producing euphoria.118 Before a doctor 




109. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., NATIONAL SURVEY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT SERVICES (N-SSATS): 2017, at 3 
(2018), https://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/dasis2/nssats/2017_nssats_rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/TMB4-6DJ 
X] [hereinafter SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONAL SURVEY].  
110. An opioid agonist attaches to opioid receptors in the brain but activates them more slowly 
than other opioids. When opioid agonists are used by an opioid-dependent person, the doses do not 
produce euphoria. Opioid agonists help to eliminate drug withdrawal symptoms and reduce drug 
cravings. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, MEDICATIONS, supra note 106, at 5–6. 
111. A partial opioid agonist binds to the “same opioid receptors [as agonists] but activates them 
less strongly than full agonists do.” Id. at 5. They are used to “reduce cravings and withdrawal 
symptoms . . . without producing euphoria.” Id.  
112. An opioid antagonist attaches to opioid receptors without activating them. Id. at 6. It works 
by blocking the activation of opioid receptors. Id. Thus, it does not control withdrawal symptoms or 
cravings. Id. Instead, it prevents an opioid drug from producing euphoria. Id.  
113. Id. at 5. 
114. Id. at 8. 
115. Id. at 5–6. 
116. Withdrawal refers to the symptoms that occur after ceasing the use of opioid drugs. AM. 
SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., OPIOID ADDICTION TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS, FAMILIES AND 
FRIENDS 6 (2016), https://eguideline.guidelinecentral.com/i/706017-asam-opioid-patient-piece/ 
[hereinafter AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., OPIOID ADDICTION TREATMENT]. Withdrawal is often 
between three to five days, but can last up to ten days. Id. Withdrawal symptoms include vomiting, 
cramps, and sweating. Id.  
117. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, MEDICATIONS, supra note 106, at 13. 
118. Id. at 6.  
119. Id. at 12.  












Intensive outpatient programs provide care while the patient is able to 
maintain outside responsibilities such as working and attending school.120 
“[I]ntensive outpatient services include individual and group counseling, 
educational groups, occupational and recreational therapy, psychotherapy, 
MAT, motivational interviewing, enhancement and engagement strategies, 
[and] family therapy . . . .”121 This level of care provides “a support system 
including medical, psychological, psychiatric, laboratory, and toxicology 
services within 24 hours by telephone or within 72 hours in person.”122  
Residential treatment centers123 “offer 24-hour structured and intensive 
care, including safe housing and medical attention.”124 Residential treatment 
“focuses on developing personal accountability and responsibility as well 
as socially productive lives.”125 Residential treatment centers often use a 
variety of therapeutic approaches with the goal of helping the patient lead a 
drug-free life following treatment.126 The treatment for drug addiction 
typically includes both medical and mental health services.127 Mental health 
services may involve cognitive-behavioral therapy which teaches patients 
to “identify and correct problematic behaviors by applying a range of 
different skills that can be used to stop drug abuse,”128 behavioral 
counseling, as well as treatment for depression and anxiety.129 Typically, 
 
120. AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., OPIOID ADDICTION TREATMENT, supra note 116, at 4; 
Outpatient Drug and Alcohol Rehab, HAZELDEN BETTY FORD FOUND., https://www.hazeldenbettyford. 
org/treatment/models/outpatient [https://perma.cc/4TQV-ZPKX]. 
121. MEDICAID INNOVATION ACCELERATOR PROGRAM, OVERVIEW OF SUBSTANCE USE 
DISORDER (SUD) CARE CLINICAL GUIDELINES: A RESOURCE FOR STATES DEVELOPING SUD DELIVERY 
SYSTEM REFORMS 7 (2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/state-resource-center/innovation-accelerator-pr 
ogram/iap-downloads/reducing-substance-use-disorders/asam-resource-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7 
AL-L54F].  
122. Id.  
123. The American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM) breaks residential treatment 
programs into four sublevels that represent a range of intensities of service (low-intensity, population-
specific high-intensity, clinically managed high-intensity, and medically monitored inpatient programs). 
What Is the ASAM Criteria?, AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED., https://www.asam.org/resources/the-asam-
criteria/about [https://perma.cc/7Z76-TK2Y]. For purposes of this Article, however, all residential 
treatment centers are grouped together.  
124. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, TREATMENT APPROACHES FOR DRUG ADDICTION 5 (2019), 
https://d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/drugfacts-treatmentapproaches.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/N7CT-M4A8] [hereinafter NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, TREATMENT APPROACHES]. 
125. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, at 33. 
126. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, TREATMENT APPROACHES, supra note 124, at 5.  
127. Id. 
128. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, at 48. “Specific techniques include 
exploring the positive and negative consequences of continued drug use, self-monitoring to recognize 
cravings early and identify situations that might put one at risk for use, and developing strategies for 
coping with cravings and avoiding those high-risk situations.” Id. at 48–49. 













the programs at residential treatment centers are highly structured and 
require that the patient remain at the residence for six to twelve months.130  
Partial hospitalization programs are appropriate for patients who are 
living with unstable medical and psychiatric conditions.131 These programs 
involve a structured outpatient setting that offers direct access to 
psychiatric, medical, and laboratory services.132 These programs “provide 
20 hours or more of clinically intensive programming each week to support 
patients who need daily monitoring and management in a structured 
outpatient setting.”133  
Many patients follow up their residential treatment with recovery 
housing, often termed soberliving homes, which provides supervised, short-
term housing for patients as they transition to an independent and drug-free 
life.134  
B. The Role of Public and Private Insurance 
Historically, individuals suffering from SUD were stigmatized because 
there was a general belief that people suffering from addiction caused their 
own illness and, as a result, did not deserve treatment.135 Further, private 
health insurers either did not cover SUD treatment or did not fund it at the 
same level as other medical or surgical care.136 There was a misconception 
that SUD treatment was too costly to include in insurance.137 The cost of 
treatment is a substantial barrier for someone who is suffering from 
substance or opioid use disorder.138 The Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act and the Affordable Care Act, however, expanded coverage for 
 
130. Id. at 5.  
131. MEDICAID INNOVATION ACCELERATOR PROGRAM, supra note 121, at 7. 
132. Id. 
133. Id.  
134. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, TREATMENT APPROACHES, supra note 124, at 5. 
135. Michael C. Barnes & Stacey L. Worthy, Achieving Real Parity: Increasing Access to 
Treatment for Substance Use Disorders Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the 
Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555, 557 (2014) (explaining 
that in addition to the self-stigma and societal stigma, there are also structural stigmas that harm people 
with SUD). “A ‘structural stigma refers to the rules, policies and procedures of institutions that restrict 
the rights and opportunities for members of stigmatized groups.’” Id. (quoting James D. Livingston et 
al., The Effectiveness of Interventions for Reducing Stigma Related to Substance Use Disorders: A 
Systematic Review, 107 ADDICTION 39, 39–40 (2012)). 
136. Blake, supra note 61, at 501.  
137. Barnes & Worthy, supra note 135, at 557–58 (explaining that in reality “it is more costly to 
let SUDs go untreated because SUD treatment reduces associated health and social costs by well over 
the cost of treatment itself”).  
138. In 2013, 37 percent of those who sought but did not receive treatment cited lack of coverage 
and inability to afford the cost as the reason they did not receive treatment. PEW CHARITABLE TRS. & 
JOHN D. & CATHERINE T. MACARTHUR FOUND., SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS AND THE ROLE OF THE 
STATES 11 (2015) [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH].  












SUD under both public and private insurance. This expansion of coverage 
made it easier for patients to afford treatment.  
1. Private Insurance 
The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA)139 and the Affordable Care Act (ACA)140 
have had a significant impact on SUD treatment. The MHPAEA was passed 
in 2008 and became effective in 2010. The MHPAEA requires group health 
plans and health insurance issuers (public and private) providing group 
health plans that offer mental health or SUD benefits to eliminate 
differences in treatment limits between mental health or SUD treatment and 
medical/surgical benefits.141 Thus, co-pays, deductibles, and visit limits 
must be the same. MHPAEA does not, however, mandate that a health 
insurance plan provide mental health or SUD benefits.  
The ACA was passed in 2010 and became effective in 2014. The ACA 
extends MHPAEA to qualified health care plans,142 Medicaid non-managed 
care plans, and plans offered through the individual market.143 The 
cornerstone of the ACA, the individual mandate, required individuals to 
obtain minimum essential health insurance coverage or pay a penalty for 
failure to do so.144 SUD treatment is included as an essential benefit that 
private insurers who participate in the online health exchange must 
 
139. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3881 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.). In 1996, Congress enacted the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA), 
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and medical/surgical benefits. MHPAEA amends MHPA to include parity for SUD. 45 C.F.R. §§ 146–
47 (2018). 
140. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18001–18122 (2018)). 
141. 45 C.F.R. § 146.136 (2018). It should be noted, however, that in 2017 20 percent of states 
offered ACA plans that violated these parity requirements. CTR. ON ADDICTION, UNCOVERING 
COVERAGE GAPS II: A REVIEW AND COMPARISON OF ADDICTION BENEFITS IN ACA PLANS 3 (2019), 
https://www.centeronaddiction.org/addiction-research/reports/uncovering-coverage-gaps-ii-review-and 
-comparison-addiction-benefits-aca [https://perma.cc/ZB9J-8FQ5].  
142. Qualified health care plans are offered through exchanges and must meet specific statutorily 
defined requirements that include essential health benefits. AMANDA K. SARATA, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R41249, MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
OF 2010, at 5 (2011). 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1) (2018) provides that a qualified health plan must: (1) have 
a certification that it meets the criteria in § 18031(c) of the ACA; (2) provide the essential health benefits 
set forth in § 18022(a) of the ACA; and (3) be offered by a licensed health insurer in good standing in 
the state where insurance is offered.  
143. SARATA, supra note 142, at 4.  
144. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 
Stat. 2054, 2092 (2017), repeals the penalty for failure to be covered by a health plan that provides 













provide.145 Further, laboratory testing (including drug testing) is also an 
essential benefit.146  
In addition to the minimum essential coverage requirements, the ACA 
also changed dependent child coverage. Prior to the ACA, health plans 
could remove children from their parents’ coverage when they became 
adults.147 The ACA requires insurers that provide dependent child coverage 
to allow parents to keep their children on their policies until the age of 
twenty-six.148 This is critical because according to the National Institute on 
Drug Abuse, “[y]oung adults (age 18 to 25) are the biggest abusers of 
prescription (Rx) opioid pain relievers, ADHD stimulants, and anti-anxiety 
drugs.”149 Thus, the ACA provided access to treatment to college students 
and graduates who would otherwise not be covered under their parents’ 
health insurance plans. 
Prior to this expanded coverage under the MHPAEA and the ACA, many 
treatment facilities only accepted direct payments.150 Now, most patients 
pay with insurance.151 Insurance plans, however, vary with respect to the 
 
145. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(E) (2018). It should be noted, however, that implementation of these 
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of the states that offered ACA plans in 2017 failed to comply with the requirements for SUD coverage. 
CTR. ON ADDICTION, supra note 141, at 3. Further, the ACA does not specify which SUD benefits must 
be covered. Id. at 2. “Instead, each state selects a benchmark plan (the ‘EHB benchmark plan’) to serve 
as a template. The benefits offered in the EHB benchmark plan become the minimum level of SUD 
coverage that ACA plans sold in the state must cover.” Id. 
146. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(H) (2018). 
147. Young Adults and the Affordable Care Act: Protecting Young Adults and Eliminating 
Burdens on Businesses and Families FAQs, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/abo 
ut-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/young-adult-and-aca [https://perma.cc/N8ZR-F3B2]. 
148. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–2714(a)(1) (2018). To stay on a parent’s plan, children do not have to 
live with their parents, attend school, be financially dependent on their parents, be unmarried, be 
ineligible for other coverage, or be unemployed. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–2714(b) (2018). 
149. Abuse of Prescription (Rx) Drugs Affects Young Adults Most, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/infographics/abuse-prescription-rx-drugs-af 
fects-young-adults-most [https://perma.cc/B2UQ-MF7Y] (last updated Feb. 2016). Indeed, adolescents 
are “particularly susceptible” to SUD because “the adolescent brain is learning patterns that persist into 
adulthood. If the disruptive patterns laid down by substance misuse during adolescence become 
dominant, the adult brain becomes ‘wired’ into them. The adult then finds it difficult, if not impossible, 
to respond appropriately to emotional, cognitive, and social environmental cues.” David E. Smith, The 
Evolution of Addiction Medicine as a Medical Specialty, 13 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 900, 903 (2011). 
150. Rick Rifenbark & Judith A. Waltz, Beyond the 12 Steps: Key Legal Issues for Substance Use 
Disorder Treatment Facilities, 18 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 15, 15 (2016). “As of 2008, about 40 
percent of nonprofit substance abuse facilities did not accept private insurance or Medicaid. About half 
had no contracts with managed care plans. About 20 percent of substance abuse treatment facilities have 
no information systems to support appointment scheduling, billing, or medical records functions.” 
PATRICIA BOOZANG ET AL., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BRIEF 
NO. 2, COVERAGE AND DELIVERY OF ADULT SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES IN MEDICAID MANAGED 
CARE 4 (2014) (footnote omitted), https://www.medicaid.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/cms-adult-
substance-abuse-services-coverage.pdf [https://perma.cc/TTF6-LPFW].  
151. Patients receive treatment from rehabilitation facilities, but they do not pay for it directly. 
See John T. McLean & Vinay Datar, Mastering the Chargemaster: Minimizing Price-Gouging and 












types of services carried, treatment limits, and which health and mental 
health providers are covered. Private residential treatment centers can cost 
from $7,500 a month to as much as $80,000 to $120,000 per month based 
on location, length of time of treatment, type of treatment, and other 
amenities.152 “Most sober living houses are privately owned and will bill 
residents directly, though some accept insurance or Medicaid.”153 
In California, and other states that follow its model, patients suffering 
from SUD can purchase insurance the day they arrive in California from out 
of state through Covered California.154 Once covered, the ACA requires that 
the insurer pay for addiction recovery. In some cases, the treatment center 
pays the premium of the patients newly signed up for health insurance.155 
2. Public Insurance 
Federal health care programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, provide 
assistance for individuals seeking SUD treatment. Medicare covers 
residential drug treatment centers, partial hospitalization, outpatient 
programs, and counseling.156 Beginning in 2020, Medicare also covers 
MAT provided through OTPs.157 In 2009, Medicare only accounted for 5 
percent of SUD treatment.158 Medicaid coverage varies by state. For those 
states that expanded Medicaid through the ACA, Medicaid includes SUD 
treatment and recovery services.159 For states that did not expand Medicaid, 
there are limited services covered such as physician services and inpatient 
services (including medically necessary inpatient detoxification).160 This 
means that in many states there is no coverage for residential treatment at 
 
Exposing the Structural Flaws in the Healthcare “Market,” 9 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. 1, 19–
20 (2014). 
Because insured patients are only responsible for their deductible and co-pay, they are unlikely to 
know or be concerned with the cost of care. Id. 
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July 1, 2019). 
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154. Sforza et al., supra note 31. 
155. Ferguson, Searching for Help, supra note 25. 
156. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MLN 
MATTERS SE1606, MEDICARE COVERAGE OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES (2016), https://www.cms.g 
ov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNMattersArticles/Downloads/SE1 
604.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R9U-J6XX]. 
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BOOKLET, MEDICARE MENTAL HEALTH 3 (2020), https://www.cms.gov/files/document/medicare-ment 
al-health-print-friendly.pdf [https://perma.cc/38M3-2KNE]. 
158. PEW RESEARCH, supra note 138, at 11. 
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all.161 In 2009, Medicaid accounted for more than 20 percent of spending on 
SUD treatment.162 
In addition to federal assistance, state governments also provide funding 
for people without insurance.163 Nearly a third of the money spent to combat 
SUD comes from state agencies and departments.164 Some states have even 
set up their own treatment centers that offer inpatient and outpatient care.165  
The amount of money spent by private and public health insurers for the 
treatment of opioid use disorder is staggering. Private employer-based 
health insurers spent $2.6 billion on the treatment of opioid use disorder in 
2016.166 Medicaid spent $9.4 billion on enrollees with opioid use disorder 
in 2013, with nearly half of that money going towards treatment and 
laboratory services.167 These figures do not include the amount of money 
spent on SUD in general.  
III. FRAUD IN THE RESIDENTIAL DRUG REHABILITATION MARKET 
With billions of insurance dollars at stake, fraud is rampant throughout 
the drug rehabilitation market. This Part examines the key problems in the 
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163. Paying for Treatment, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. (Oct. 2019), 
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People with Employer Coverage, PETERSON-KFF HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/a-look-at-how-the-opioid-crisis-has-affected-people-with-e 
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residential drug rehabilitation market. First, it addresses the fraudulent 
practices of patient brokering and the overutilization of drug tests. 
Rehabilitation facilities rely upon patient brokering to obtain patients 
through trickery and deceit. Once the facilities obtain the patients and pay 
patient brokers their fee, the facilities then proceed to overtest the patients 
for drugs through urine screenings to pad their insurance bills. Second, it 
scrutinizes the care that residential drug rehabilitation facilities are 
providing patients. It argues that patients are receiving poor care because 
residential drug treatment programs are focused on abstinence and the 
twelve-step program rather than evidence-based treatment.  
A. Fraudulent Practices at Residential Drug Treatment Facilities 
The well-intentioned expansion of health care coverage for SUD 
combined with the opioid epidemic encouraged many new treatment centers 
to enter the market to meet the demand for SUD treatment services.168 
Unfortunately, not all of the new entrants into the market are legitimate 
treatment centers. To remain profitable, these treatment facilities must have 
a steady stream of patients with insurance. Disreputable rehabilitation 
facilities have turned to patient brokering and excessive drug urinalysis 
testing to turn a profit. As NBC news has reported, “the country’s opioid 
epidemic ha[s] provided [rehabilitation facilities] with a trove of desperate 
people, many young and hooked on pills or heroin, and access to a deep 
pool of insurance dollars.”169  
1. Patient Brokering 
Patient brokering occurs when a drug rehabilitation facility pays a third 
party (the patient broker) to recruit patients with insurance who are suffering 
from SUD.170 Oftentimes, the patient brokers will offer cash or material 
 
168. Rifenbark & Waltz, supra note 150, at 15. 
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Overdoses, Fraud, NBC NEWS (June 25, 2017, 11:46 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/megyn-
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5/28/addict-brokers-opioids/ [https://perma.cc/8JRM-XYJW] [hereinafter Armstrong & Allen, Addict 
Brokers]. As explained by Armstrong and Allen in another article on this issue: 
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incentives (such as low rent or free housing, gift cards, prepaid debit cards, 
gym memberships, etc.) to patients in exchange for them seeking treatment 
at the facility that contracted with the patient broker.171 The patients operate 
under the misconception that “they are being referred by a responsible party 
who has their best interest at heart, but patient brokers and the addiction 
treatment centers that use them are primarily focused on their finances.”172 
Some patient brokers charge fees ranging from $500 to $5,000 per patient 
and treatment centers pay it because they will receive reimbursements from 
insurance companies of $25,000 to $30,000 per patient per month.173 Other 
patient brokers receive monthly fees from certain facilities but must meet a 
quota of patients every month.174 This practice is unethical because patient 
brokers are motivated by financial incentives rather than the needs of the 
individual patient.175  
The marketing practices of patient brokers and treatment centers are also 
incredibly problematic. Prior to changes by Google, patient brokers were 
bidding on treatment-related keywords on Google such as “rehab near me,” 
which brought them to the top of Google search results for those terms.176 
 
HMOs and government insurance plans like Medicaid are shunned by treatment centers 
engaged in patient brokering because they either limit where treatment can be provided or pay 
much less than PPOs. 
The patients are often enrolled through HealthCare.gov, the online insurance marketplace 
created by the Affordable Care Act that connects patients to insurers in dozens of states. 
The brokers use phony addresses to sign up people immediately — a change of address is an 
exception to the usual limitation that customers can sign up only during the end-of-year open 
enrollment period — and to take advantage of the best-paying PPO plans in states in which 
they don’t live. The brokers, patients’ families, or marketers for the treatment centers pay the 
insurance premium. Within a few weeks, the insurer is billed tens of thousands of dollars for 
what is often subpar care. 
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surance-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/Z3DH-QRBQ] [hereinafter Armstrong & Allen, Desperate for 
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175. It is also illegal under the federal Anti-Kickback statute if the patient has health care through 
a federal health care program, such as Medicare or Medicaid. See infra Part V (discussing the reach of 
the Anti-Kickback statute).  
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14, 2017, 7:51 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/14/16309752/google-rehabs-near-me-search-
adwords-crackdown [https://perma.cc/SA8D-XERS] [hereinafter Ferguson, Sketchy Rehab Ads]; see 
also Michael Smith et al., Why It Took Google So Long to End Shady Rehab Center Ads, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 26, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-09-
26/why-it-took-google-so-long-to-end-shady-rehab-center-ads [https://perma.cc/4RDG-MF4J]. On 












The patient brokers or rehab centers paid Google every time someone 
clicked on their ads.177 Some of the most unethical brokers were also editing 
the phone numbers on the web sites of legitimate rehabilitation facilities or 
creating web pages for non-existent rehabilitation facilities to redirect the 
calls to call centers.178  
The representatives at the call center will then get detailed information 
about the type of treatment needed and, most importantly, insurance 
information so that they can run a verification of benefits.179 Once the 
representative has that information, she can calculate how much a policy 
will pay a facility per day.180 At that point, the representative (many times a 
recovering addict herself) will do all that she can to convince the patient to 
go to a particular treatment center.181 Many treatment centers offer plane 
tickets and waivers of co-pays and coinsurance, but to get around issues of 
patient brokering they have patients sign promissory notes to pay them 
back.182 As a result of these marketing practices, thousands of addicts arrive 
in south Florida from Ohio, West Virginia, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania 
every year.183 California residential drug rehabilitation facilities similarly 
use patient brokers to convince uninsured patients to come to California 
telling them that they have received a “scholarship” to go into drug rehab.184 
In reality, however, they are signing up for insurance through the California 
ACA exchange called Covered California.185 
There is simply no concern about whether the patients will ever use drugs 
again. Relapse is profitable for these treatment centers because insurance 
companies will pay for a higher level of care if an addict relapses.186 
According to Gene Sullivan, chief financial officer at A New Start Inc. in 
Palm Springs, legitimate rehabilitation centers have lost patients to patient 
brokers: “The client brokers come and say all you have to do is pee in this 
cup, we will buy you food, buy you cigarettes.”187 Some of the most 
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unscrupulous patient brokers hang around sober living homes and wait or 
encourage a patient to relapse.188 “The game plan is get these people who 
are early in recovery, vulnerable and will relapse. Relapse is good business 
for these flop houses.”189 Relapse is also incredibly profitable for the patient 
brokers. Once previously referred patients have relapsed, patient brokers 
will either refer them back to the original rehabilitation facility or to another 
facility for a fee.190 Thus, patient brokers stand to gain more from a patient 
who relapses because they can receive multiple referral fees.  
Florida State Attorney Dave Aronberg has cracked down on patient 
brokering in the state of Florida. He describes the scam of patient brokering, 
insurance fraud, and the cycle of opioid dependence and relapse as the 
“Florida Shuffle.”191 Aronberg created the Sober Homes Task Force in 
Florida.192 Since July 2016, the Sober Homes Task Force has made more 
than ninety arrests and has obtained thirty-six convictions.193 The concern 
is that the success of the Sober Homes Task Force “has sent some of the 
criminal element in the drug treatment and sober home industries scurrying 
to other communities and other states that are unaware and unprepared for 
the Florida Shuffle.”194  
2. Overutilization of Drug Tests 
Residential drug rehabilitation facilities are often not providing the 
treatment that the patients need to fully recover from SUD and avoid 
relapse.195 Instead of providing treatment, the rehabilitation centers are 
repeatedly drug testing patients because laboratory testing is included in 
insurance plans as an essential service.196 John Lehman, President of the 
Florida Association of Recovery Residences, has explained it this way: 
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patient] to remain in the program so they can bill the insurance company for 
as many days as the insurance company will pay for services.”197 Indeed, 
drug treatment centers in Florida and California have billed insurance 
companies for millions of dollars’ worth of treatment comprised of 
counseling and drug testing without helping the patients recover.198 
Drug testing, which uses a biological sample to detect specific chemical 
compounds (drugs) in the system, is often considered a necessary 
component of residential drug rehabilitation.199 Typically, facilities do 
everything that they can to ensure that patients do not have access to 
addictive substances.200 During the intake procedure, the facility examines 
the patient’s belongings to make sure that the patient has not hidden any 
substances.201 In addition, facilities often screen mail and packages to avoid 
substances entering the facility.202 To be certain that the patient has not been 
using substances during her stay, the facility may perform random drug 
screening as part of the program.203 Residential drug rehabilitation centers 
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patient. Risk and cost of failing to detect non-adherence and relapse is a consideration for the 
patient, healthcare professional and for society as a whole. 













often perform drug testing through urine screening.204 Urine screening is 
minimally invasive, and drugs have a longer detection time in urine than in 
blood or saliva.205 Drugs can be detected in the body for one to three days 
depending on the pharmacological characteristics of the drug.206 The 
window of detection can also depend on drug sensitivity, pattern of drug 
use, and urine concentration.207  
ASAM states that “[u]rine drug testing is a key diagnostic and 
therapeutic tool that is useful for patient care in monitoring of the ongoing 
status of a person who has been treated for addiction.”208 Thus, ASAM 
recommends the use of drug testing in several phases of addiction treatment: 
(1) screening and diagnostic evaluation; (2) treatment; and (3) long-term 
monitoring.209 As ASAM has explained, 
A knowledgeable clinician can use drug testing to verify self-reports, 
confirm diagnoses, identify denial and minimization of drug and 
alcohol use, enhance motivation for treatment, measure biological 
adaptation, assist in development of treatment planning, monitor 
treatment response, document treatment effectiveness and outcomes, 
support patient advocacy by validating abstinence from alcohol and 
drug use, and validate adherence in taking prescribed controlled 
substances.210 
In 2017, “[d]rug or alcohol urine screening was provided by 86 percent of 
all [drug rehabilitation] facilities.”211 
ASAM similarly recommends random drug testing at sober living homes 
because drug use in that environment “compromises the recovery 
 
204. AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT ON DRUG TESTING, supra note 
199, at 1. 
205. AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., DRUG TESTING: A WHITE PAPER, supra note 199, at 23. 
The most commonly used biological matrices for drug testing include: urine, saliva, hair, blood, and 
sweat. Id. Prior to advancements in drug testing technology in the 1970s, the default testing matrix was 
blood. Id. Now, it is urine because it “is copious, easily and noninvasively collected, and does not require 
elaborate sample preparation before testing.” Id. Urine also has the benefit of being the least expensive 
matrix to analyze. Id. Urine, however, is vulnerable to “subversion” when patients are unmonitored. Id. 
206. AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT ON DRUG TESTING, supra note 
199, at 1 (explaining that detection of drugs is possible “[b]ecause [due to] their water-solubility and 
lipid-solubility, alcohol and other drugs are rapidly distributed to virtually every tissue in the body”). 
207. AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., DRUG TESTING: A WHITE PAPER, supra note 199, at 23. 
208. AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT ON DRUG TESTING, supra note 
199, at 3.  
209. AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., DRUG TESTING: A WHITE PAPER, supra note 199, at 48. 
Drug testing is important in diagnostic settings because health care professionals need objective 
evidence to determine whether the patient has recently used drugs and is suffering from SUD. Id.  
210. Id. at 49. 
211. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 
109, at 25.  












environment itself for all residents of the facility.”212 Drug testing in sober 
living homes can verify abstinence of the patient and help to “maintain the 
integrity of the sober residence for the group.”213 
The costs of drug tests can vary widely. In workplace and school settings, 
testing is relatively inexpensive because it occurs infrequently in a 
population without a high prevalence of SUD.214 This testing involves 
checking for a small number of commonly used drugs.215 In the clinical 
treatment setting where adherence to treatment is a concern, however, 
testing is more frequent and sophisticated due to the prevalence of designer 
drugs216 used to avoid detection in drug tests.217 Accordingly, much more 
advanced and expensive drug tests are needed in this setting.218 Laboratories 
charge higher prices for analyzing the results of tests that require advanced 
testing technologies.219 In addition, the cost of drug testing increases when 
the laboratory is checking for multiple drugs.220 Further, the cost rises due 
to expensive confirmation tests after an initial positive test.221 The costs of 
drug testing are passed on to insurers (public and private) and patients.222 
There is not an agreed upon standard for the amount or type of drug testing 
necessary in residential drug rehabilitation. 
While drug testing can be incredibly helpful in the residential treatment 
setting; it is also the source of fraud and abuse from overutilization. 
Residential drug rehabilitation centers treating an individual for opioid 
abuse might regularly test that individual’s urine for amphetamines, 
antidepressants, antipsychotics, or other drugs even when there is nothing 
in the patient’s history that would suggest use of those other drugs because 
it means higher reimbursement for the center.223 
To maximize profits from drug testing, some residential drug treatment 
centers and sober living homes test patients two to four times a week.224 
 
212. AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., DRUG TESTING: A WHITE PAPER, supra note 199, at 52. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 15. 
215. Id. 
216. Designer drugs are “designed to produce psychoactive effects similar to compounds familiar 
to drug users but to elude drug tests and drug laws.” Id. at 5. 
217. Id. at 16.  
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 15–16. 
221. Ferguson, Searching for Help, supra note 25.  
222. AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., DRUG TESTING: A WHITE PAPER, supra note 199, at 17. 
223. David Segal, In Pursuit of Liquid Gold, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.co 
m/interactive/2017/12/27/business/urine-test-cost.html [https://perma.cc/VW9T-NAMC] (discussing 
the urinalysis bill of a patient addicted to heroin who was inappropriately tested for amphetamines in 
addition to opiates for six months).  













These treatment centers have also made deals with laboratories to run more 
expensive chemical tests on the urine to drive up the insurance bill from 
hundreds of dollars to thousands of dollars.225 In some cases, the recovery 
facilities also own the labs performing the drug tests.226 These drug testing 
practices turn a patient’s “urine into his most valuable asset, generating 
insurance bills of more than $1,000 a day in some cases.”227 Once the 
disreputable facility cannot collect any more insurance money, the patient 
with SUD is “kicked out of the center and onto the streets, a practice so 
routine there’s a name for it[:] ‘curbing.’”228 
Private insurers have taken steps to crack down on overutilization and 
the high costs of drug testing.229 Some private insurers have imposed 
limitations on drug testing, and others have imposed caps on the 
reimbursement amount for drug testing.230 Insurers, such as Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of New Jersey, have even sued laboratories for medically 
unnecessary drug tests.231 Similarly, Cigna (one of the largest health 
insurance companies) sued a laboratory over a kickback scheme.232 But, the 
crackdown on fraud does not simply hurt the disreputable residential 
treatment centers and sober living homes; it also harms legitimate treatment 
centers and their patients. Indiscriminately reducing or capping coverage 
may go against legitimate medical judgment and prevent patients from 
receiving the care that they need. Cigna departed from Florida’s health 
insurance exchange in late 2015, ahead of open enrollment for 2016.233 
Cigna blamed its decision to withdraw on fraud and abuse and on “out-of-
network substance abuse clinics and labs.”234 Whether this explanation for 
withdrawing from the exchange is credible or not, there is no question that 
 
225. Id. 
226. Sforza et al., supra note 31. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. In January 2017, for example, UnitedHealthcare sued Next Health (a network of laboratories) 
for $100 million for medically unnecessary and overpriced urine tests as well as kickbacks and bribes to 
doctors. Segal, supra note 223. 
230. Id. 
231. PRNewswire, Avee Laboratories Contests Lawsuit Filed by Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of New Jersey, PROVIDENCE J. (Oct. 24, 2013, 5:01 PM), https://www.providencejournal.com/article/20 
131024/News/310249969 [https://perma.cc/A93T-AY97]. 
232. Ken Alltucker, Labs, Doctors Scrutinized over Lucrative Drug Tests for Pain-Pill Abuse, 
USA TODAY: AZCENTRAL (Dec. 26, 2015, 5:02 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/in 
vestigations/2015/12/26/labs-doctors-scrutinized-over-lucrative-drug-tests-pain-pill-abuse/77181470/ 
[https://perma.cc/65NS-7WL8]. 
233. Ron Hurtibise, Citing Fraud by Substance Abuse Centers, Cigna Withdraws from Florida’s 
















it hurt patients who were insured by Cigna and needed residential drug 
treatment.  
B. Poor Quality of Care 
As the need for residential drug treatment grows and new treatment 
centers enter the market, there is a concern regarding the quality of care that 
centers are providing patients with SUD. In California, one patient dies 
every sixteen days in a drug rehabilitation facility.235 And, hundreds more 
die after leaving rehabilitation centers while still addicted to drugs.236 Critics 
of the industry argue that these statistics reflect “poor care – sometimes 
nonexistent care – offered in many rehab centers” and that it can be more 
profitable to provide substandard than quality care.237 Reputable drug 
treatment centers find it “tough to stay in business while providing good 
medical care when a growing percentage of [their] competitors are 
profiteers.”238 And, it is difficult for patients to assess quality because nearly 
all treatment centers advertise success rates of 80 percent or higher without 
objective evidence to back up their claims.239 
It is not clear that even legitimate residential drug rehabilitation facilities 
are providing quality care. Quality care requires both professionally trained 
and credentialed staff as well as evidence-based treatment practices.240 But, 
there are no national standards for either the facilities or the individuals who 
provide treatment. And, even in states that have standards, there is very little 
regulatory oversight.241 In many ways, the drug rehabilitation industry is 
outside of the health care system. The National Center on Addiction and 
Substance Abuse at Columbia University explains it this way: 
For just about all known diseases other than addiction, treatment is 
provided within a highly-regulated health care system. In contrast, 
patients with the disease of addiction are referred to a broad range of 
 




239. Dan Munro, Inside the $35 Billion Addiction Treatment Industry, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2015, 
1:29 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2015/04/27/inside-the-35-billion-addiction-treatme 
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PROGRAM SELECTION 2, https://www.naatp.org/sites/naatp.org/files/NAATP.GuideToChoosingAddicti 
onTreatment_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/T97R-QBNY]. 
241. Sforza et al., supra note 31 (“There are few bars to getting a license to run a rehab center in 
California, regardless of academic or criminal background. Physicians who have had their medical 
licenses revoked by the state serve as chairmen or chief executives of some centers. And with some state 
prison systems offering classes in rehab center management, it’s not unusual for ex-cons to serve as 













providers largely exempt from medical training and standards (for 
many of whom the main qualification may be that they themselves 
have a history of addiction) who work within a fragmented system of 
care with inconsistent regulatory oversight.242  
The staff chiefly responsible for patient care in residential drug treatment 
centers are addiction counselors.243 Most states require addiction counselors 
to be licensed, but the licensing requirements may include nothing more 
than a high school diploma and some training on the twelve-step model of 
recovery.244 Quite simply, most addiction counselors “lack an education 
grounded in the science of addiction and are not equipped to deliver 
evidence-based treatments including appropriate medical care and treatment 
of co-occurring health conditions.”245 The lack of training for addiction 
counselors and others providing treatment to patients with SUD leads to 
inconsistent treatment and care for patients.246  
While states have various licensing requirements for residential drug 
rehabilitation centers, very few states mandate the use of evidence-based 
practices in SUD treatment.247 Nor are evidence-based practices in common 
usage at addiction treatment centers.248 Evidence-based addiction medicine 
can be defined as “the use of current best evidence in making decisions 
about the care of individual patients. It combines clinical expertise with the 
best available research on a topic of concern gathered from various 
sources.”249 Unfortunately, there is not always a consensus on which 
 
242. NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., ADDICTION 
MEDICINE: CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 176 (2012), http://www.centeronaddic 
tion.org/sites/default/files/Addiction-medicine-closing-the-gap-between-science-and-practice_1.pdf [ht 
tps://perma.cc/HU5J-WLRD]. 
243. Id. at 178.  
244. Id. The twelve-step model “involves a brief, structured and manual-driven approach 
implemented over the course of 12 to 15 sessions by a trained counselor or treatment provider.” Id. at 
111.  
245. Id. at 178.  
246. Id. at 178.  
247. Id. at 194 (explaining that a 2006 survey found that only three states have legislation that 
“mandate or encourage” evidence-based practices and one of the states only mandates their use for state-
funded facilities). 
248. Steve Gallon, Univ. of Wash. Alcohol & Drug Abuse Inst. & Nw. Frontier Addiction Tech. 
Transfer Ctr., About Evidence-Based Practices, EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES FOR SUBSTANCE USE 
DISORDERS (2013), http://adai.washington.edu/ebp/about.htm [https://perma.cc/M88J-JKQ9] 
(explaining that oftentimes research literature does not provide adequate information to implement a 
practice and the evidence-based practice may require “policy adjustment, resource acquisition, 
procedural documentation, staff training and ongoing supervision to assure accurate implementation”). 
Further, a new practice may challenge existing philosophical values. Id. 
249. STEWART B. LEAVITT, ADDICTION TREATMENT FORUM, CAN ADDICTION RESEARCH BE 
TRUSTED?: INTRODUCING EBAM 1 (2003), http://atforum.com/documents/EBAM_6_Pager.pdf [https:/ 
/perma.cc/G7VJ-LDZH]. The most rigorous form of medical research is randomized controlled clinical 
trials (RCTs). In RCTs, “patients are carefully selected and then randomly assigned to Experimental and 












practices have enough evidence to support their use in clinical settings. 
Many entities have competing lists of evidence-based practices to treat 
SUD. But, there are many practices that appear on nearly every list of 
evidence-based practices.250 In addition, the U.S. Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration has an Evidence-Based Practices 
Resource Center that provides information on “clinically sound and 
scientifically based policies, practices and programs.”251 The Resource 
Center is meant to be dynamic and capable of responding to changing 
science and evidence and is updated with guidance documents and other 
materials that provide the latest scientific evidence on SUD treatment.252  
One prominent example of evidence-based treatment exists at the clinics 
of the Hazelden Betty Ford Foundation.253 The Hazelden Betty Ford 
Foundation has created an evidence-based treatment plan for opioid 
addiction called the Comprehensive Opioid Response with Twelve Steps 
(COR-12) that they have implemented at their clinics.254 Their program 
involves MAT, cognitive-behavioral therapy, motivational interviewing,255 
and Twelve-Step Facilitation.256 All of these practices were extensively 
studied.  
 
Control groups, which are followed for the outcomes of interest. The groups are equally matched 
demographically (e.g., age, sex, etc.) and any extraneous factors (confounders) are assumed to be equally 
distributed across groups.” Id. at 3. The most reliable scientific evidence involves a systematic review 
and meta-analyses of RCTs. Id. The most common studies in addiction medicine, however, are Cohort 
Studies. In Cohort Studies, a “single group may be involved, but usually two or more groups of patients 
(cohorts) are enrolled and either receive the treatment of interest (Experimental group) or do not 
(Controls). The groups are followed forward in time to observe outcomes of interest.” Id. 
250. See, e.g., Univ. of Wash. Alcohol & Drug Abuse Inst. & Nw. Frontier Addiction Tech. 
Transfer Ctr., EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES FOR SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS, https://adai.uw.edu/ebp/ 
[https://perma.cc/HNP7-GHN5] (click “main search,” then “Browse All (A-Z)”) (listing cognitive-
behavioral therapy and buprenorphine (i.e. MAT) in its list of evidence-based treatment); NAT’L INST. 
ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, at 6 (listing buprenorphine as a pharmacological treatment 
and cognitive-behavioral therapy in its list of evidence-based approaches to SUD treatment). 
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HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.samhsa.gov/ebp-resource-
center/about [https://perma.cc/XRT6-WHTF] (last updated Apr. 23, 2020). 
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www.hazeldenbettyford.org/recovery-advocacy/opioid-epidemic/joining-forces [https://perma.cc/2FR7 
-V5W4]. 
255. “Motivational interviewing is an evidence-based treatment that addresses ambivalence to 
change. It is a conversational approach designed to help people identify their readiness, willingness, and 
ability to change and to make use of their own change-talk.” Motivational Interviewing, CASE W. RES. 
U.: CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED PRACS., https://www.centerforebp.case.edu/practices/mi [https: 
//perma.cc/4BSV-CFKB]. For people with SUD, it helps them “[d]iscover their own interest in 
considering and/or making a change in their life.” Id.  
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It is possible that one of the reasons that the use of evidence-based 
treatments is not more widespread is the stigma associated with the disease. 
There is still a belief on the part of some that people with SUD have caused 
their own condition—the notion that being an addict is a “moral 
fail[ure].”257 The reality, however, is that SUD “is a brain disorder resulting 
in a chronic medical condition analogous to other chronic diseases like type 
2 diabetes and high blood pressure.”258 The failure to view SUD as a chronic 
medical condition may cause some treatment centers to continue to focus 
on Twelve-Step programs259 and abstinence rather than evidence-based 
care.  
Many facilities cling to the outdated model of abstinence and Twelve-
Step programs. Approximately 90 percent of drug treatment facilities are 
based on abstinence, which for many years has been synonymous with the 
Twelve-Step recovery program260 of Alcoholics Anonymous.261 Abstinence 
 
12-sessions of individual therapy in which the therapist actively encourages engagement in AA, 
and walks the patient through the first four steps of the AA program. The therapist conveys the 
concept that addiction is a chronic, progressive, and potentially fatal illness for which the only 
successful strategy is abstinence achieved one day at a time by following a 12-step program of 
recovery. 
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS & DEP’T OF DEF., VA/DOD CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINE FOR THE 
MANAGEMENT OF SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS 93 (2015), https://www.healthquality.va.gov/guidelines 
/MH/sud/VADoDSUDCPGRevised22216.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBK7-9J8V]. 
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surrounding-opioid-use-disorder [https://perma.cc/9SD4-64YZ] (quoting Dr. Patrice Harris, chair of the 
American Medical Association’s Opioid Task Force).  
258. Id.  
259. A Twelve-Step program is one that adapts the twelve steps of AA to the specific needs of 
patients with SUD. One of the foundations of the program is group meetings with other people who are 
in recovery. “[M]eetings provide a safe place for people in recovery to meet, share their experiences, 
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process.” Michael Graubart, Twelve Step Meetings FAQs, HAZELDEN BETTY FORD FOUND. (June 23, 
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WXV-2KB9]. Importantly, a Twelve-Step program is not the same as Twelve-Step Facilitation. Twelve-
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as a way of successfully moving from treatment to recovery. It is used in combination with other 
evidence-based treatments. In contrast, some rehabilitation facilities use Twelve-Step programs as their 
chief mode of treatment. Twelve-Step programs are not, however, treatment for SUD. See infra note 273 
and accompanying text.   
260. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 
109, at 26. 
261. What Is A.A.?, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, https://www.aa.org/pages/en_US/what-is-aa [htt 
ps://perma.cc/2NKQ-TKAV]. The twelve steps include:  
1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—that our lives had become unmanageable. 
2. Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity. 
3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we understood 
Him. 
4. Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves. 
5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact nature of our wrongs. 












requires the complete cessation of drug use. Thus, those using MAT would 
not be considered abstinent and would be unable to participate in a 
residential drug treatment program that is based on abstinence. Indeed, 
“[o]ne of the key predictors of the underutilization of [MAT] is adherence 
of treatment providers to a strong 12-step ideology for addiction 
treatment.”262 Some providers also question whether it is appropriate to use 
MAT to treat SUD because they believe that “it’s merely replacing one drug 
with another.”263 Given that MAT can cut the mortality rate for SUD 
patients by half,264 it is particularly problematic that the majority of 
providers reject MAT in favor of abstinence and Twelve-Step programs.265  
Abstinence-based care became popular in the 1980s as the model for 
addiction treatment. Indeed, the Hazelden Betty Ford Foundation, which 
now leads the way in evidence-based treatments such as MAT, “used to 
subscribe almost exclusively to the abstinence-only model.” 266 Abstinence-
based treatment focuses on an individualized treatment plan, spirituality, 
family involvement, and group meetings common to Alcoholics 
Anonymous.267 Twelve-Step groups “provide a social network that supports 
 
6. Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character. 
7. Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings. 
8. Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make amends to them all. 
9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do so would injure 
them or others. 
10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong promptly admitted it. 
11. Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious contact with God as we 
understood Him, praying only for knowledge of His will for us and the power to carry 
that out. 
12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we tried to carry this message 
to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all our affairs. 
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, THE TWELVE STEPS OF ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS (1981) (emphasis 
omitted), https://www.aa.org/assets/en_US/smf-121_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WTD-X7UL]. 
262. NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., supra note 242, at 
206. 
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265. This is not to say, of course, that there are no risks associated with MAT or that MAT works 
for all patients. Id. (“One catch is that even these medications, though the best forms of opioid addiction 
treatment, do not work for as much as 40 percent of people with opioid addiction. Some patients may 
prefer not to take any medications because they see any drug use whatsoever as getting in the way of 
their recovery, in which case total abstinence may be the right answer for them. Others may not respond 
well physically to the medications, or the medications may for whatever reason fail to keep them from 
misusing drugs. This isn’t atypical in medicine. What works for some people, even the majority, isn’t 















recovery; they emphasize both the powerfully compulsive nature of 
addiction and the importance of harnessing an individual addict’s personal 
responsibility.”268 
There are many criticisms of Twelve-Step programs269 and very little 
evidence to support their efficacy,270 but many people consider Twelve-Step 
programs to be essential to recovery maintenance.271 It is important to 
remember that treatment for SUD must be individualized.272 Thus, Twelve-
Step programs may be critical to help some people remain sober and 
completely unnecessary for others. Most importantly, however, the Twelve-
Step program, which is a support service, does “not qualify as treatment for 
a medical disease.”273 Indeed, “[f]ew would argue that any other disease be 
treated solely via support groups composed of those who themselves have 
had the condition.”274 SUD, like other medical diseases, requires 
 
268. Annette Mendola & Richard L. Gibson, Addiction, 12-Step Programs, and Evidentiary 
Standards for Ethically and Clinically Sound Treatment Recommendations: What Should Clinicians 
Do?, 18 AMA J. ETHICS 646, 647 (2016).  
269. Some criticisms include: 
Several features of TS [Twelve-Step] programs make them a poor fit for some people who are 
seeking recovery. To begin with, some who eschew TS programs might find the emphasis on 
spirituality off-putting. AA maintains that the “Power greater than ourselves” can be construed 
as a non-theistic power, such as the power of the community, but this rings hollow for some 
recovery seekers. Additionally, TS programs promote the goal of abstinence, but moderation is 
a better goal for some people. Some people find that the emphasis on powerlessness erodes 
their confidence, and others dislike the group format inherent in TS. And some are bothered by 
the inconsistent, somewhat sloppy reasoning that runs through the TS philosophy. For example, 
AA’s position that alcoholism is an illness or malady (akin to an allergy) seems out of step with 
its view that it’s a spiritual problem; and the claim that alcoholism is not a moral failing seems 
at odds with phrases like make “a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves” and 
“remove all defects of character” found in Step 4 and Step 6. 
Perhaps the most damning criticism of AA and other TS programs concerns the variability in 
adherence to core tenets from group to group. Since it is nonprofessional by design, quality 
control measures are minimal, and there is no way to ensure that every group adheres 
consistently to all of its principles. Thus, some criticisms of TS refer to beliefs and attitudes 
that can be found in some individual TS groups or members but that are inconsistent with the 
official position of AA. These include that it is a religious (specifically Christian) organization; 
that it shames addicts as being morally flawed; that members are not allowed to use medications 
to support sobriety; and that AA claims that it is the only way someone can get sober. 
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tility-toward-the-12-steps [https://perma.cc/2DFN-ZNQH] (arguing that “12-Step recovery is widely 
misunderstood and under-researched” and that “[r]ecovery is not just about stopping one isolated 
behavior (drug use) but learning a new way of life – and this is the real value of 12-Step recovery”). 
272. NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., supra note 242, at 
208. 
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individualized evidence-based medical treatment.275 As Dr. Shelly 
Greenfield of Harvard Medical School has stated, “[t]here is no other 
comparable example in medicine where you have evidence-based 
treatments that are not available” to patients suffering from a treatable 
medical condition.276 Thus, it is harmful for residential rehabilitation 
programs to be organized around nothing more than abstinence and the 
Twelve-Step program when there are effective evidence-based treatments 
available to treat the disease of addiction.  
IV. ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION IN THE DRUG REHABILITATION 
MARKET 
This Part employs economic theory to understand and assess the inability 
of patients to choose and receive quality care. Specifically, it looks at 
information about quality as a good that drug rehabilitation consumers have 
difficulty acquiring due to severe informational asymmetries in the market.  
A. Information and Residential Drug Treatment Centers 
Consumers often do not have the information they need to assess the 
quality of goods and services prior to purchasing them. This is particularly 
true when it comes to assessing the quality of residential drug treatment 
centers. Very little federal or state information is publicly available 
concerning the quality of services provided by residential drug treatment 
facilities. In addition, consumers cannot rely upon the information that they 
receive from largely unregulated drug rehabilitation facilities. This is in 
stark contrast to other goods where quality can be readily assessed either 
before or after purchase. Further, as addiction is a chronic disease,277 it is 
difficult to assess quality of care even after receiving care at a drug 
rehabilitation facility because that may only be one component of the care 
needed to treat the disease. The lack of information is compounded by the 
fact that the drug rehabilitation industry is not squarely placed in the 
 
275. Id. (“Whereas research clearly indicates that to be effective interventions should be tailored 
not only to the stage and severity of a patient’s illness but also to a patient’s co-occurring conditions and 
other personal characteristics and life circumstances that might affect treatment outcome, most health 
professionals and addiction treatment programs follow a one-size-fits-all approach to treatment. . . . 
Having patients pass through a rigid, time-limited treatment program that assumes uniformity in disease 
symptoms and severity simply burdens patients with unnecessarily extensive interventions or with 
interventions that are too brief or superficial to have a significant impact on their symptoms.”). 
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healthcare field despite the fact that addiction is a chronic disease.278 This 
Part argues that information concerning the quality of care at drug 
rehabilitation facilities is a credence good. Once it is established that quality 
of care at these facilities is a credence good, the need for government 
intervention to protect vulnerable consumers becomes clearer. 
When discussing goods and services, economists tend to group them into 
three categories based on their attributes: (1) search goods and services; (2) 
experience goods and services; and (3) credence goods and services.279 For 
search goods and services, quality can easily be discerned prior to 
consumption.280 For example, a consumer can go to a drug store and 
examine band aids prior to purchase to see if there are some in the size that 
she needs. Thus, the size of the band aids becomes the search attribute and 
the consumer can use that attribute to determine if the price is fair prior to 
purchase.  
If a product has experience attributes, however, it means that the 
consumer cannot judge the product until she experiences it, which occurs 
only after purchase.281 A consumer cannot tell if the band aid that she 
purchased will stick well to her skin just by examining the size. Therefore, 
she cannot assess the band aid’s value to her based on stickiness until 
purchase and consumption. If the consumer is a repeat purchaser of band 
aids and has acquired knowledge about which brand’s band aids stick best 
to her skin, then that will mitigate her information problem.282 
When products have credence attributes, the consumer may not be able 
to determine the quality of the goods and services even after purchase and 
consumption.283 Information on the quality of residential drug rehabilitation 
 
278. See supra Part III.B; Lurie, supra note 5 (“The rehabs themselves exist in a quasi-medical 
realm where evidence-based care is rare, licensed medical staffers are optional, conflicts of interests are 
rampant, and regulation is stunningly lax.”). 
279. Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection Liability: An 
Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 59, 62; Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer 
Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 312–15 (1970). 
280. Nelson, supra note 279, at 312; see also Butler & Johnston, supra note 279, at 59 (explaining 
that “[w]ith search goods, consumers can learn about quality, and reward high-quality providers with 
higher prices if the cost of searching and observing quality is sufficiently low that they will continue to 
search—by moving on to another store—if they observe unexpectedly low quality. Indeed, with search 
goods, high prices may themselves signal high quality” (footnote omitted)). 
281. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490–91 (1970); see also Butler & Johnston, supra note 279, at 59–61 
(explaining that it is more costly to determine the quality because the consumer must buy and use the 
product for some period of time, and that with experience goods the ability to base future purchasing 
decisions on quality will vary with the type of good and the speed that consumers can learn about quality 
and act on it).  
282. Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry, 14 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 19 (2007). 
283. Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. 
& ECON. 67, 68–69 (1973). 












programs has credence attributes for two reasons: (1) the severe information 
asymmetry between the rehabilitation center and the patient and (2) the 
unique position of drug rehabilitation programs in the medical industry. 
1. Asymmetric Information Problems 
The drug rehabilitation market is rife with asymmetric information 
problems. Bad actors in the market take advantage of the information gap 
between residential drug rehabilitation facilities, patients, and third-party 
payers. This prevents patients from making the best drug treatment decision 
and causes inefficiency in the market. 
The information asymmetry occurs because the residential drug 
rehabilitation facilities, whether reputable or not, have important 
information “that would materially affect” the patient’s care decision, but 
the rehabilitation facilities are either concealing that information or it is 
costly for the patient to acquire it.284 Specifically, the patient has difficulty 
obtaining objective information concerning the quality of care at particular 
rehabilitation facilities. It is an industry norm to “offer little objective, 
independent data on how well their programs work over the long haul.”285 
Even if a provider wanted to provide objective data, “there are no industry-
accepted standards for elastic terms such as ‘sobriety’ or ‘relapse’ or 
‘success.’”286 This permits “disreputable providers to charge the consumer 
for goods or services never provided, or provide the wrong quantity or type 
of goods or services to the consumer (under- or over-providing).”287  
Indeed, one of the key problems in the drug rehabilitation market is 
providing the wrong quantity or type of goods or services to the consumer. 
Due in part to patient brokering, many drug rehabilitation centers are over-
providing drug tests and under-providing counseling services and evidence-
based treatment to patients who need those services to fully recover and 
avoid relapse. Because the patients are already vulnerable and suffering 
from SUD, there is little chance that they can accurately judge the quality 
of the care even after they have received it.288 A person with SUD would 
simply not have the expertise to determine whether the treatment was 
inadequate or whether she had not done enough to benefit from the 
 
284. Patrick A. McLaughlin et al., Regulatory Reform in Florida: An Opportunity for Greater 
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285. Sforza et al., supra note 31. 
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287. Butler & Johnston, supra note 279, at 63.  
288. See, e.g., Kristin Madison, Regulating Health Care Quality in an Information Age, 40 U.C. 
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treatment. This uncertainty with respect to quality distinguishes the drug 
rehabilitation market from perfectly competitive markets.289 Further, 
“[b]ecause consumers have trouble assessing the quality of the service, 
providers of such services may have little incentive to maintain or improve 
the quality of their services, causing failure of ‘the market for “high” quality 
services.’”290 
Simply put, disreputable residential drug rehabilitation centers and sober 
living homes have no incentive (financial or otherwise) to provide quality 
services. Record numbers of patients are seeking treatment for SUD and 
many are falling prey to internet and call center scams because they do not 
have the ability to determine which drug rehabilitation centers and sober 
living homes are legitimate.291 Further, in states like California, it is easier 
to obtain consumer information, including complaints, about restaurants 
and auto repair shops, than it is to obtain consumer information on 
residential drug treatment centers.292 In addition, because patient brokers 
often send patients away from their home state, there is no opportunity to 
visit the facility beforehand to determine if it is a reputable treatment center. 
Further, some treatment facilities contract with sober living homes and the 
sober living homes offer drugs to the patients so that they get addicted again 
and go back to the rehabilitation center to start treatment all over again.293 
Thus, there is no feasible means for patients to obtain information to judge 
quality and no incentive for disreputable treatment centers to provide 
information. There is no reason to believe that the market can self-correct 
the informational asymmetry.  
The information gap in the drug rehabilitation market may evidence an 
even larger problem in the market. As Butler and Johnston have explained, 
“[w]ith incomplete consumer information about product quality, market 
existence itself becomes an issue.”294 In a market with asymmetric 
 
289. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 941, 951 (1963) (explaining the product uncertainty with respect to quality that exists with 
medical care generally).  
290. McLaughlin et al., supra note 284, at 112 (quoting CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, 
BUREAU OF ECON., THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 6 (1990)). 
291. The Editorial Board, Opioid ‘Patient Brokers’ Who Prey on the Addicted Finally Get the 
Treatment They Deserve, USA TODAY (Oct. 23, 2018, 6:17 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opini 
on/2018/10/23/opioid-patient-brokers-finally-get-treatment-they-deserve-editorials-debates/167179200 
2/ [https://perma.cc/T9B7-BGWE] (explaining that “[a]ddicted individuals and their worried loved ones 
are easy prey because finding effective, professional treatment is so difficult and confusing” and that 
“[i]n a country with 2.1 million people suffering from opioid addiction, [the patient brokering] business 
is booming”); Lurie, supra note 5 (discussing the increase in addiction rates and the corresponding 
demand for treatment). 
292. Sforza et al., supra note 31.  
293. Id.  
294. Butler & Johnston, supra note 279, at 55.  












information (such as the residential drug rehabilitation market), where 
buyers cannot properly judge the quality of services, buyers may only 
understand the average quality of the services.295 As a result, high-quality 
sellers have difficulty differentiating themselves from low-quality sellers.296 
If high-quality sellers cannot identify themselves, buyers “will think every 
seller’s good is of average quality, and they will not pay more than the value 
of average quality.”297 Because high-quality providers cannot charge a 
higher price, they do not make a profit.298 Under these market conditions, 
high-quality sellers may leave the market.299 “But when the very highest 
quality sellers drop out of the market, the average quality falls and the new 
highest quality sellers may lose money, causing them to leave the market, 
leading to market disequilibrium.”300 In this situation, low-quality services 
can drive out high-quality services.301 This is known as the lemons market 
problem.302  
In the context of the drug rehabilitation market, low-quality providers 
have flooded the market and captured market share through dishonest 
tactics. As John Lehman, director of the Florida Association of Recovery 
Residences, has noted:  
The scammers have made it difficult for the ethical, and sorely 
needed, treatment centers and sober homes to survive . . . . The broad 
brush of bad actions and illegal activity is painting across 
everybody . . . . So the good guys are having trouble keeping their 
beds full. And the bad guys are saying you want to shoot dope in the 
bathroom, go ahead.303 
Lehman’s assessment is anecdotal.304 Thus, it is too soon to tell whether 
high-quality residential drug rehabilitation providers will be driven from the 
market based on these conditions. High-quality providers have strong 
incentives to provide information concerning quality to potential patients. 
But, low-quality providers have strong incentives to hide information 
concerning quality to potential patients. Under these conditions, high-
quality providers may change their advertising tactics or join or create trade 
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groups that can attest to the quality of their services.305 The risk of the drug 
rehabilitation market becoming a lemons market is real and must be 
addressed through government regulation.  
2. The Unique Position of Drug Rehabilitation in the Medical Industry 
In the medical industry, the lack of information about quality is more 
pronounced than in the industry of any other important commodity.306 As 
Kenneth Arrow has explained: 
Recovery from disease is as unpredictable as is its incidence. In most 
commodities, the possibility of learning from one’s own experience 
or that of others is strong because there is an adequate number of 
trials. In the case of severe illness, that is, in general, not true; the 
uncertainty due to inexperience is added to the intrinsic difficulty of 
prediction. Further, the amount of uncertainty, measured in terms of 
utility variability, is certainly much greater for medical care in severe 
cases than for, say, houses or automobiles, even though these are also 
expenditures sufficiently infrequent so that there may be considerable 
residual uncertainty.307 
This is compounded in the drug rehabilitation industry because consumers 
cannot expect the same level of regulation and protection that they are 
accustomed to in the medical industry.  
Medical professionals must meet minimum education requirements, be 
certified by the American Medical Association (in the case of doctors), and 
be licensed in their state before they can treat patients.308 These 
requirements exist to ensure quality and protect patients.309 Most 
importantly, they prohibit non-trained individuals from providing medical 
services through the threat of criminal sanctions.310 Even though the 
 
305. See, e.g., SHATTERPROOF, https://www.shatterproof.org [https://perma.cc/LN5H-KWQ4]. 
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Id. Some insurance companies have contributed to the funding of Shatterproof. Our Partners, 
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treatment at drug rehabilitation facilities clearly involves medical treatment 
of the disease of addiction, the American Medical Association does not 
govern the certification of health care professionals at these facilities. Nor 
do state medical boards grant licenses to these professionals. 
As explained in Part III.B, the drug rehabilitation industry is on the 
outside of the highly regulated health care system. At the same time, 
however, for purposes of public and private insurance it is treated the same 
as other medical providers. Without streamlined care, it is incredibly 
difficult for consumers to obtain reliable information about the quality of a 
particular facility.  
B. Costs of Failed Rehabilitation Facilities 
The costs of the opioid crisis are staggering. The White House Council 
of Economic Advisers estimates that in 2015, the economic cost of the 
opioid crisis was $504 billion, which amounts to 2.8 percent of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) for that year.311 The economic cost comprises both 
the cost of opioid-related overdose deaths and the cost of nonfatal opioid 
misuse.312  
The Council quantified the costs of opioid-related overdose deaths based 
on the value of a statistical life (VSL).313 They used a VSL of $5.4 million. 
The Council also found that officially reported opioid-involved overdose 
deaths were underestimated because opioids are underreported on death 
certificates. The Council estimated that opioid-involved overdose deaths 
were 24 percent higher than official reports suggested.314 Thus, they found 
that in 2015, there had been 41,033 opioid-related overdose deaths. The 
fatality cost for 2015 was $221.6 billion.315 
Next, the Council estimated the cost of nonfatal opioid misuse.316 These 
costs include increases in healthcare and substance abuse treatment costs, 
criminal justice costs, and reductions in productivity.317 To determine the 
cost of nonfatal opioid misuse, the Council estimated the per-person 
measure of costs of opioid misuse for those who did not die within the year 
and multiplied that by the number of individuals with an opioid use disorder 
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in 2015.318 The Council estimated the per-person measure of costs of opioid 
misuse at $30,000319 and multiplied that by the 2.4 million people with 
opioid use disorders, resulting in a total cost of $72.3 billion for non-fatal 
consequences.320  
The Council’s report demonstrates the economic toll that the opioid crisis 
is having on the United States. At this juncture, it is not possible to segregate 
out the costs of the opioid crisis that are attributable to disreputable 
residential drug rehabilitation facilities and sober living homes. Nor is it the 
goal of this project to do so. Nevertheless, many patients check into 
residential rehabilitation facilities multiple times and some of those visits 
are likely to disreputable facilities.321 The danger for patients treated at 
disreputable rehabilitation facilities is heightened—“Patients weaned from 
opioids at disreputable facilities exit with a lower tolerance for such drugs. 
If they relapse, which happens all too often, they can easily overdose on an 
amount they previously tolerated.”322 Further, patients who leave drug 
rehabilitation without the proper care are unlikely to be productive members 
of society.323 These patients are in a much worse position than they would 
have been if they received proper care at a reputable residential drug 
rehabilitation facility.324 Undoubtedly, the corruption in the drug 
rehabilitation market is contributing to the costs of the opioid crisis. And, 
as the demand for drug rehabilitation services increases, the costs will 
continue to mount.  
V. ELIMINATING PATIENT BROKERING 
In October 2018, Congress passed and the President signed into law the 
Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and 
Treatment (SUPPORT) for Patients and Communities Act (the SUPPORT 
Act).325 Sections 8121 and 8122 of the SUPPORT Act contain the 
Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 2018 (EKRA).326 The goal of 
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EKRA is to eliminate the practice of patient brokering.327 This Part 
examines EKRA and its ability to combat patient brokering and address the 
informational asymmetries in the residential drug treatment market.  
EKRA’s text is very similar to the federal health care program anti-
kickback statute (the AKS).328 The AKS was enacted to prevent payments 
to doctors in exchange for patient referrals to other health care providers.329 
The concern with these types of payments is that the healthcare provider 
may make care decisions based on financial incentives rather than the best 
interests of the patient.330 There is also the concern that “financial rewards 
to providers for patient referrals might drive up [federal health care] 
program costs by encouraging the provision of unnecessary or inordinately 
expensive medical care.”331 The AKS makes it unlawful to: (1) knowingly 
and willfully; (2) offer or pay, solicit or receive; (3) any remuneration; (4) 
to induce the referral of an individual to another person or entity for the 
“furnishing of any item or service,” or to induce the purchasing or ordering 
 
327. 164 CONG. REC. H9244 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2018) (statement of Rep. Pallone) (“I know this 
proposal is well-intentioned in addressing the serious problem of patient brokers who are taking 
advantage of individuals with opioid use disorders and referring them to substandard or fraudulent 
providers in exchange for kickbacks.”). 
328. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2018). The Anti-Kickback statute provides: 
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a Federal health care program, or 
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or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both. 
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of such item or service; (5) payable “in whole or in part” by a federal health 
care program, such as Medicare and Medicaid.332  
The AKS appears to be an ideal statute to combat the problem of patient 
brokering. A patient broker who accepts kickbacks from drug rehabilitation 
centers in exchange for sending insured patients to those drug rehabilitation 
facilities would clearly violate the command of the AKS. The problem, 
however, is that the AKS only applies to federal health care programs. Thus, 
it would not reach patient brokers and drug rehabilitation facilities that have 
defrauded private insurance companies. With the expansion of coverage for 
drug rehabilitation in the ACA and the Mental Health Parity Act, patient 
brokerage schemes extend well beyond federal health care programs and, 
thus, the reach of the AKS.333 
EKRA attempts to remedy the shortcoming in the AKS regarding private 
insurance. EKRA applies to health care benefit programs, defined as “any 
public or private plan or contract, affecting commerce, under which any 
medical benefit, item, or service is provided to any individual.”334 The 
health care benefit program must be “in or affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce.”335 This provision is necessary to make the legislation 
constitutional under the Commerce Clause.336 Congress has the authority 
“[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”337 And, as the 
Supreme Court has explained, “[w]here economic activity substantially 
affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be 
sustained.”338 As explained in Parts I and III, both the opioid epidemic and 
the problems in the drug rehabilitation industry span across the United 
States. Further, as noted in Part II, both public and private insurance is being 
used across state lines to pay for drug rehabilitation services.  
EKRA goes further than simply expanding the AKS to apply to private 
insurance. EKRA provides:  
[W]hoever, with respect to services covered by a health care benefit 
program, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly 
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(1) solicits or receives any remuneration (including any kickback, 
bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or 
in kind, in return for referring a patient or patronage to a recovery 
home, clinical treatment facility, or laboratory; or 
(2) pays or offers any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, 
or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in 
kind— 
(A) to induce a referral of an individual to a recovery home,339 
clinical treatment facility,340 or laboratory; or 
(B) in exchange for an individual using the services of that 
recovery home, clinical treatment facility, or laboratory, 
shall be fined not more than $200,000, imprisoned not more than 10 
years, or both, for each occurrence.341 
EKRA defines laboratory as it is defined in the Public Health Service 
Act.342 The Public Health Service Act defines laboratory as a “facility for 
the biological, microbiological, serological, chemical, immuno-
hematological, hematological, biophysical, cytological, pathological, or 
other examination of materials derived from the human body for the purpose 
of providing information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any 
disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human 
beings.”343 Nothing in this definition of laboratories limits EKRA’s 
application to laboratories that are involved in drug testing for SUD clinical 
treatment centers or recovery homes.  
The failure to limit laboratories for the purposes of EKRA may be the 
result of inartful drafting. Interestingly, EKRA did not originally apply to 
laboratories.344 It only applied to clinical treatment facilities and recovery 
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homes.345 It appears that laboratories were a last minute addition to EKRA 
when it was passed as part of the SUPPORT Act. Further, EKRA as a whole 
was not initially included in the SUPPORT Act.346 Representative Pallone 
expressed his concerns regarding the addition of EKRA:  
 Mr. Speaker, there is one provision that is concerning and that I 
do want to mention. It did not go through regular order and was not 
properly vetted. In fact, it was added at the very last minute. That is 
a proposal by Senator Rubio to create a new criminal antikickback 
statute.  
 I know this proposal is well-intentioned in addressing the serious 
problem of patient brokers who are taking advantage of individuals 
with opioid use disorders and referring them to substandard or 
fraudulent providers in exchange for kickbacks. This is an issue, but 
since the bill was introduced last Tuesday night, multiple 
stakeholders have raised concerns that the language does not do what 
we think it does. It may have unintended consequences.  
 Mr. Speaker, I hope this is a good lesson to all of us that passing 
legislation that has not been properly vetted, and that the public has 
not had an adequate chance to review, is unwise.347 
Given the legislation’s failure to limit the categories of laboratories 
subject to EKRA’s provisions, there is a very real danger that EKRA could 
be used to prosecute laboratories for relationships that would be excepted 
from the AKS. This is significant because the penalty for a violation of both 
the AKS and EKRA is up to ten years in prison, with fines of up to $100,000 
and $200,000, respectively.348 
The AKS has safe-harbor provisions that except certain financial 
arrangements from its broad prohibitions.349 Although EKRA also has safe-
harbor provisions,350 there are considerably less of them. In addition, where 
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(1) a discount or other reduction in price obtained by a provider of services or other entity 
under a health care benefit program if the reduction in price is properly disclosed and 
appropriately reflected in the costs claimed or charges made by the provider or entity; 
(2) a payment made by an employer to an employee or independent contractor (who has a 
bona fide employment or contractual relationship with such employer) for employment, if 
the employee’s payment is not determined by or does not vary by—  
 (A) the number of individuals referred to a particular recovery home, clinical treatment 
facility, or laboratory; 
 (B) the number of tests or procedures performed; or 












the AKS and EKRA safe-harbor provisions overlap, EKRA is more 
restrictive. One prominent example involves employees. Rather than using 
a third-party referral service and paying for referrals, health care providers 
may hire an employee to work as a sales representative. If the employee 
receives a commission for referrals, the arrangement could easily run afoul 
of the AKS. Thus, the AKS has a safe harbor for a “bona fide 
employ[ee].”351 Under the AKS, the bona fide employee safe harbor excepts 
from the AKS’s reach “any amount paid by an employer to an employee 
(who has a bona fide employment relationship with such employer) for 
employment in the provision of covered items or services.”352 EKRA 
similarly has an exception for a “bona fide employ[ee],” but the 
employment arrangement will run afoul of EKRA if the employee’s 
payment is determined by or varies based on the number of individuals 
referred, the number of tests or procedures performed, or the amount billed 
to or received from a health care benefit program.353 There are no such 
 
 (C) the amount billed to or received from, in part or in whole, the health care benefit 
program from the individuals referred to a particular recovery home, clinical treatment 
facility, or laboratory; 
(3) a discount in the price of an applicable drug of a manufacturer that is furnished to an 
applicable beneficiary under the Medicare coverage gap discount program under section 
1860D-14A(g) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395w-114a(g)); 
(4) a payment made by a principal to an agent as compensation for the services of the agent 
under a personal services and management contract that meets the requirements of section 
1001.952(d) of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on the date of enactment 
of this section; 
(5) a waiver or discount (as defined in section 1001.952(h)(5) of title 42, Code of Federal 
Regulations, or any successor regulation) of any coinsurance or copayment by a health 
care benefit program if— 
 (A) the waiver or discount is not routinely provided; and 
 (B) the waiver or discount is provided in good faith; 
(6) a remuneration described in section 1128B(b)(3)(I) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
1320a-7b(b)(3)(I)); 
(7) a remuneration made pursuant to an alternative payment model (as defined in section 
1833(z)(3)(C) of the Social Security Act) or pursuant to a payment arrangement used by a 
State, health insurance issuer, or group health plan if the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services has determined that such arrangement is necessary for care coordination or value-
based care; or 
(8) any other payment, remuneration, discount, or reduction as determined by the Attorney 
General, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, by regulation.  
18 U.S.C. § 220(b). 
351. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B). 
352. Id. Under the statute, an employee is any worker that satisfies the common law rules for 
establishing an employer-employee relationship. Id. Under the common law, courts will often look to 
employer control, supervision, and training to determine whether someone is an employee. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992). Once it is established that someone is an 
employee, the courts will also analyze thirteen factors to determine whether someone is a bona fide 
employee. Id. 













restrictions under the AKS. Thus, a payment arrangement for an employee 
that involves commissions for referrals could be legal under the AKS but 
illegal under EKRA. This difference between the AKS and EKRA is even 
more important given that EKRA is not limited to laboratories doing 
business with clinical treatment facilities or recovery homes. Thus, any 
laboratory that hires an employee as a sales representative and pays that 
employee a commission based on the number of individuals referred, tests 
performed, or the amount billed to insurance could be in violation of EKRA. 
It seems unlikely that Senator Rubio intended that outcome when he 
sponsored EKRA354 because that would be a huge expansion of liability. 
EKRA will likely be a very useful tool for prosecutors to pursue 
unethical treatment providers who rely upon patient brokering to obtain 
patients. There are concerns about the reach of the statute beyond the 
rehabilitation market, but hopefully prosecutors will exercise discretion and 
choose not to upend the financial arrangements of every laboratory. While 
it is too early to tell whether EKRA will help prosecutors eliminate fraud in 
the market, it is already clear that it will not do anything to address the 
informational asymmetries that exist in the market or ensure quality care. 
Nothing in EKRA’s provisions helps consumers to discern which providers 
use evidence-based practices and require staff training in addiction science. 
Thus, while EKRA is an important first step in cleaning up the residential 
drug rehabilitation market, there is still more work to be done to ensure 
adequate information to consumers and quality care.  
VI. VALUE-BASED REIMBURSEMENTS 
In the United States health care system, insurance companies 
predominantly pay health care providers on a fee-for-service basis (FFS).355 
In other words, each doctor visit and service provided (i.e. lab test, imaging 
scan, etc.) are billed separately.356 With FFS, providers are paid for seeing 
patients, regardless of clinical outcome. This Part examines the costs and 
 
354. S. 3254, 115th Cong. § 220(a) (2018). 
355. Dale B. Thompson, The Next Stage of Health Care Reform: Controlling Costs by Paying 
Health Plans Based on Health Outcomes, 44 AKRON L. REV. 727, 730 (2011); Cody Vitello, 
Transforming the Way We Pay Doctors, 19 ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 34, 38–39 (2009).  
356. Thompson, supra note 355, at 730; Vitello, supra note 355, at 38–39. As Vitello explains:  
When third parties are responsible for paying the bill, such as insurance companies, they either 
reimburse the physician based off of predetermined schedules or the customary, prevailing, and 
reasonable (CPR) reimbursement method. Fee schedules are established by surveying the 
average charges for a certain procedure or negotiated with the physician to establish the 
maximum the third party is willing to pay. The CPR method establishes a separate fee schedule 
for each physician and reimburses services based on the lowest actual charge, customary 
charge, or the geographic area’s prevailing charge.  
Id. at 39 (footnotes omitted). 












benefits of the FFS model and Aronberg’s proposal for outcome-based 
reimbursement for drug rehabilitation services.  
A. Substituting Outcome-Based Reimbursement for FFS 
FFS “encourages over-utilization, discourages primary and secondary 
prevention, and fails to promote integrated, coordinated care.”357 For 
example, because insurance providers provide reimbursement for each 
urinalysis a residential drug treatment center performs, disreputable 
treatment centers test their patients as often as possible.358 Multiple urine 
tests in a week are not contributing to the outcome that patients seek—
sobriety. But FFS incentivizes this behavior because profits “increase 
consistently with greater quantities” of provided services.359 Similarly, 
profits increase from more costly services.360 
Some scholars have advocated for changing the insurance 
reimbursement system to a value-based approach.361 This would change the 
focus from the services provided to a specific outcome. A value-based 
approach would increase performance pressures on providers. One 
challenge that comes along with a value-based reimbursement system is 
assessing performance. There would have to be well-defined targets that 
providers are expected to meet and a means of measuring performance 
against those targets. Further, the level of payment would also have to be 
tied to the performance targets.  
Aronberg argues that the ACA’s FFS reimbursement model should be 
changed to an outcome-based model to prevent exploitation by corrupt drug 
treatment providers.362 Aronberg notes that the “ACA changed Medicare to 
 
357. TOM LATKOVIC, THE TRILLION DOLLAR PRIZE 15 (2013). 
358. Ferguson, Searching for Help, supra note 25. 
359. Thompson, supra note 355, at 730. Thompson further explains that: 
[T]he fee-for-service system creates incentives by rewarding volume but not quality or 
outcomes. This leads to a number of problems: provision of a substantial amount of care with 
little value, under-provision of other care with higher value, perverse incentives for poor quality 
care as services to correct for earlier errors lead to higher levels of compensation, excessive use 
of high technology equipment, an oversupply of hospital beds, and insufficient incentives for 
managing and educating patients through low-cost ways of improving their health. In the end, 
this payment system rewards health care providers more if their patients are less healthy. 
Id. at 734. 
360. Id. 
361. See, e.g., id. at 746–53 (advocating for a payment system based on health outcomes); David 
A. Hyman & Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay for: Result-Based Compensation for Health Care, 
58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427 (2001) (arguing that health care providers are more likely to provide high 
quality care if they are paid to do so). 
362. Change the Affordable Care Act’s Fee-for-Service Reimbursement Model to Outcome Based 














reduce payments to hospitals with high readmission rates while providing 
bonuses to providers that achieve high scores on patient outcome and care 
experiences.”363 He argues that Medicare’s outcome-based reimbursement 
model should be applied to private insurers who pay for drug rehabilitation 
services.364 Further, Aronberg argues that switching to an outcome-based 
reimbursement model would “reward the best recovery centers while 
shuttering rogue operators who give false promises and illicit benefits to 
patients, then siphon precious resources into treating and then encouraging 
repeated relapses.”365 
There are no further details on Aronberg’s proposal, but the idea deserves 
serious consideration. In discussing Medicare’s outcome-based 
reimbursement,366 Aronberg presumably references the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services’ (CMS) hospital value-based purchasing plan 
(VBP). The initiative “rewards acute-care hospitals with incentive payments 
for the quality care provided to Medicare beneficiaries.”367 Specifically, it 
rewards hospitals based on the quality of care, how closely best clinical 
practices are followed, and how well hospitals enhance patients’ experience 
of care during hospital stays.368 As Aronberg mentions, hospital 
reimbursements are reduced if the healthcare system experiences a certain 
percentage of readmissions that are deemed to have been preventable by the 
hospital.369 
Under the program, CMS no longer pays hospitals based on the quantity 
of services provided.370 CMS assesses achievement and improvement scores 
for each Hospital VBP measure.371 CMS then employs a threshold and 
benchmark to determine how many points to award for the achievement and 
improvement scores. Hospitals are gauged on several measures of outcome: 
 
363. Id.  
364. Id. 
365. Id. 
366. For a history of quality assessment in Medicare, see Eleanor D. Kinney, The Affordable Care 
Act and the Medicare Program: Linking Medicare Payment to Quality Performance, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 567 (2013). 
367. MEDICARE LEARNING NETWORK, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HOSPITAL 
VALUE-BASED PURCHASING 2 (2017), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learni 
ng-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/Hospital_VBPurchasing_Fact_Sheet_ICN907664.pdf [ht 
tps://perma.cc/F4U8-V6YE]. 
368. Id. at 3. 
369. Change the Affordable Care Act’s Fee-for-Service Reimbursement Model to Outcome Based 
Reimbursement, supra note 362. 
370. MEDICARE LEARNING NETWORK, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 
367, at 3. 
371. The Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/Value-Bas 
ed-Programs/HVBP/Hospital-Value-Based-Purchasing.html [https://perma.cc/76H8-L7U4] (last 
updated Jan. 6, 2020). 












(1) mortality and complications; (2) healthcare-associated infections; (3) 
patient safety; (4) patient experience; (5) process; and (6) efficiency and 
cost reduction.372 The idea is that if a hospital has its reimbursements 
reduced because of its poor care, the hospital will make improvements.373 
Indeed, the hope is that “[v]alue-based purchasing will encourage providers 
to reorganize in ways that promote efficiency and collaboration with other 
types of providers toward the same end.”374 
There is no doubt that if value-based reimbursement works properly, 
then transitioning from an FFS to a value-based reimbursement model 
would largely remove fraudulent treatment centers’ incentives to take part 
in the residential drug rehabilitation market. If these facilities could no 
longer run up the insurance bills by billing for duplicative and unnecessary 
services, there would be no financial gain. But, getting the program to work 
properly will be an “immensely difficult task” because “[q]uality has 
multiple dimensions and is often highly subjective, making ‘quality care’ 
impossible to define uniformly for diverse populations. Even when it is 
possible to settle on a reasonable definition of quality, measures can be 
difficult to translate into financial incentives.”375 In addition, there is very 
little evidence to support the idea that these financial incentives actually 
change provider behavior or, perhaps more importantly, improve patient 
outcomes.376 
B. Assessing the Quality of Care 
Medical care quality can be measured based on outcomes, process, 
structural factors, and patient satisfaction.377 Because of the problems 
 
372. Id. 
373. Karen Kane, Note, How Much Does Quality Cost? Analyzing the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act’s Value-Based Purchasing Provision and How It Could Affect the Delivery of Care 
by Hospitals, 14 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 69, 91 (2011). 
374. Kinney, supra note 366, at 601.  
375. Michael F. Cannon, Pay-for-Performance: Is Medicare a Good Candidate?, 7 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 4 (2007). 
376. Eric T. Roberts et al., The Value-Based Payment Modifier: Program Outcomes and 
Implications for Disparities, 168 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 255, 261 (2018) (evaluating CMS’s Value-
Based Modifier program and finding that it was ineffective in improving performance on average and 
that “pay-for-performance programs with weak incentives and inadequate risk adjustment could 
contribute to health care disparities without eliciting a behavioral change that improves care on 
average”); Aaron E. Carroll, The Problem with ‘Pay for Performance’ in Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (July 
28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/upshot/the-problem-with-pay-for-performance-in-me 
dicine.html?partner=rss&emc=rss [https://perma.cc/M3QK-HYKJ] (evaluating multiple studies on pay 
for performance). 
377. Cannon, supra note 375, at 4; Avedis Donabedian, Evaluating the Quality of Medical Care, 













previously noted concerning patient assessment of quality,378 this Article 
will focus on outcome, process, and structure.  
1. Outcomes 
In the drug rehabilitation market, it will be difficult to accurately measure 
outcomes. First, measuring outcomes requires the ability to determine 
desirable and undesirable results. The undesirable result that immediately 
comes to mind is relapse. But, relapse is a normal part of treatment. Further, 
patient relapse is not completely within the control of the rehabilitation 
facility. There are many factors beyond the rehabilitation center that play 
into whether someone relapses. As Karen Kane has argued: 
Outcome measurements examine the result of the treatment on the 
individual patient with a particular illness or condition. Such results 
are considered by many to be less reliable because of the many factors 
that may affect the patient’s condition “outside the provider’s 
control.” Specifically, some outcomes are subjected to influences that 
are not within the control of medical intervention, including the 
severity of the patient’s condition, his compliance to medical 
treatment, and the nature of the condition. Additionally, the outcome 
that is desired is questioned because every patient and provider may 
view this differently. While quality outcomes are the goal of most 
healthcare providers, linking reimbursement to quality outcomes is 
challenging and may lead to a less reliable method of assessment.379 
Thus, it may be inappropriate to reduce reimbursement to a residential 
treatment center based on the relapse rate when that rate may be influenced 
by the severity of the illness, the patient’s support system, job prospects, 
mental health, and other factors beyond the control of the facility. Another 
undesirable result is death due to overdose. But, if that is going to be part of 
the calculus in deciding reimbursement rate, then how long after treatment 
will this outcome be measured? And, much like examining the relapse rate, 
the mortality rate “might indicate good or bad care in the aggregate,” but it 
does not “give an insight into the nature and location of the deficiencies or 
strengths to which the outcome might be attributed.”380  
Second, gathering the data would likely be more difficult than what is 
required for the hospital value-based purchasing plan. Unlike typical health 
 
378. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
379. Kane, supra note 373, at 75 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Anne B. Claiborne et al., Legal 
Impediments to Implementing Value-Based Purchasing in Healthcare, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 442, 466 
(2009)). 
380. Donabedian, supra note 377, at 694.  












care patients who receive treatment and any subsequent follow-up care near 
their homes, individuals with SUD travel all over the United States to 
receive treatment, stay at sober living homes, and then return home. This 
will make it more challenging to track patients and measure outcomes.  
2. Process 
If quality of care cannot be accurately measured solely based on 
outcomes, then perhaps the process of care could be considered. Process 
measures would allow us to assess the extent to which rehabilitation 
facilities are utilizing evidence-based practices.381 The American Medical 
Association (AMA) has published principles for pay-for-performance 
programs382 and process appears to be the most important measure of 
quality.383 It is the AMA’s expectation that “[e]vidence-based quality of 
care measures must be the primary measures used” in value-based 
reimbursement programs.384 It should be noted, however, that process-based 
quality measures are likely to be “less stable and less final than those that 
derive from the measurement of outcomes.”385 At the same time, however, 
they may “be more relevant to the question at hand: whether medicine is 
properly practiced.”386 A process-based quality measure would be 
particularly helpful in the drug rehabilitation setting because it would 
incentivize more providers to use evidence-based practices to treat their 
patients. 
 
381. As Avedis Donabedian has stated, measuring quality by the process of care would allow us 
to determine “whether what is now known to be ‘good’ medical care has been applied.” Id.  
Judgments are based on considerations such as the appropriateness, completeness and 
redundancy of information obtained through clinical history, physical examination and 
diagnostic tests; justification of diagnosis and therapy; technical competence in the 
performance of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, including surgery; evidence of 
preventive management in health and illness; coordination and continuity of care; acceptability 
of care to the recipient and so on. This approach requires that a great deal of attention be given 
to specifying the relevant dimensions, values and standards to be used in assessment. 
Id. 
382. Pay-for-performance is another name for value-based reimbursement. See generally Cannon, 
supra note 375.  
383. AM. MED. ASS’N, PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES H-450.947 (2018). 
384. Id. at 2. The principles specify that programs should ensure quality of care, foster the 
patient/physician relationship, offer voluntary physician participation, use accurate data and fair 
reporting, and provide fair and equitable program incentives. Id. 















Finally, structural quality measures are aimed at assessing the setting in 
which care takes place and “the instrumentalities of which it is the 
product.”387  
It is concerned with such things as the adequacy of facilities and 
equipment; the qualifications of medical staff and their organization; 
the administrative structure and operations of programs and 
institutions providing care; fiscal organization and the like. The 
assumption is made that given the proper settings and 
instrumentalities, good medical care will follow.388  
Although structural quality measures may initially seem appealing, there 
are limitations that may render this measure less effective.389 As Michael 
Cannon has noted, “[t]he mere availability of sophisticated human and 
physical capital offers no direct evidence of whether those resources are 
being used optimally. Meeting structural quality measures can also require 
large investments, which raise costs and may undercut cost-
effectiveness.”390 In the drug rehabilitation industry, however, focusing on 
structure as one measure of quality would likely benefit patients because it 
would prevent run-down facilities without properly trained staff from 
receiving reimbursements.  
C. Implementation and Effectiveness 
Assuming arguendo, that accurate quality measures could be determined, 
implementation may be difficult. There would be high administrative costs 
for insurers and providers associated with transforming the billing and 
reimbursement system. There would also be substantial costs for providers 
associated with structural and process-based quality reforms because of the 
need to train and hire qualified staff and utilize evidence-based practices. It 
is possible that, in the long run, the costs could be mitigated by cost-savings 
that would result from the shift from FFS to value-based care. In the short 
term, however, it is likely that these costs would be passed on to consumers.  
Aside from high administrative costs, it is not clear that this proposal will 
alleviate the informational asymmetries in the residential drug treatment 
market. The change in billing from FFS to value-based reimbursement will 
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provide a great deal of information to insurers concerning the quality of 
care. But, it does not provide that information directly to consumers. It may 
take some time for a fraudulent center to shutter its doors due to 
reimbursement reductions. In the meantime, consumers have no way of 
knowing whether they are at a reputable residential drug treatment center. 
It is certainly possible that the government or insurers would make the 
information publicly available,391 but there is nothing in the proposal that 
would guarantee that outcome. Finally, even if this information is publicly 
available it may not be used by healthcare consumers due to “difficulty in 
locating it, constraints on the ability of patients to make choices . . . even if 
quality information is available (e.g., limited choice in selecting health 
plans, or healthcare providers within a plan), and the belief that quality data 
are not as trustworthy as word of mouth.”392  
VII. CORRECTING INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES THROUGH 
ACCREDITATION AND LICENSING OF DRUG REHABILITATION FACILITIES 
The key problem that needs to be addressed is the severe informational 
asymmetries that exist in the drug rehabilitation market.393 This Part argues 
that the most effective means of accomplishing the goal of alleviating 
information asymmetries is mandatory accreditation and licensing 
requirements.  
For asymmetries of information, neoclassical economics would advocate 
that the government intervene through disclosure mandates,394 government 
 
391. For example, the United States Department of Health and Human Services created a website 
to help Medicare patients shop for hospital care based on quality and price. See Claiborne et al., supra 
note 379, at 449.  
392. Id. at 467.  
393. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
394. Mandated disclosure is a heavily used regulatory technique. Ben-Shahar and Schneider argue 
that mandated disclosure fails because it is rare that lawmakers, disclosers, and disclosees properly play 
their parts. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 647, 679 (2011). For lawmakers, mandatory disclosure is appealing  
because it resonates with two fundamental American ideologies. The first is free-market 
principles. Mandated disclosure may constrain unfettered rapacity and counteracts caveat 
emptor, but the intervention is soft and leaves everything substantive alone: prices, quality, 
entry. Instead of specifying outcomes of transactions or dictating choices, it proffers 
information for making better decisions. . . . It supposes that people make better decisions for 
themselves than anyone can make for them and that people are entitled to freedom in making 
decisions.  
Id. at 681 (footnote omitted). The appeal of mandated disclosures “lead lawmakers to mandate disclosure 
too often and too broadly.” Id. at 684. But, even if lawmakers require the correct amount of disclosures, 
there is still the possibility that the disclosers will have difficulty understanding or complying with the 
requirements. Further,  
mandated disclosure rests on false assumptions: that people want to make all the consequential 













production, and dissemination of information, or even behavioral 
mandates.395 In addition, the government should intervene for the purpose 
of consumer protection.396 Consumer protection laws are needed to correct 
distortions in the marketplace. They are intended to ensure that consumers 
can choose effectively among competitive options, “with their critical 
faculties unimpaired by . . . deception or the withholding of material 
information.”397 
In the drug rehabilitation market, consumer deception is rampant. As 
explained in Part III, the goal of disreputable residential drug rehabilitation 
facilities is to deceive desperate and vulnerable people suffering from SUD 
to come to their facilities so that the facility can overbill Medicare and 
Medicaid or private insurance companies. There is no question that 
consumers are unable to choose effectively among competitive options. 
This is exactly the type of situation where the government must intervene 
to protect vulnerable consumers. As Eleanor D. Kinney argues, “[t]he more 
vulnerable, dependent, and mentally compromised the patients are, the 
greater the danger that these patients might be endangered if regulatory 
oversight of the safety and quality of their care is limited.”398 Information 
on the quality of drug rehabilitation facilities is a credence good.399 Thus, 
the goal of any regulation should be to signal quality to the consumer. One 
of the most effective ways to accomplish that goal is to require accreditation 
and licensing.  
A. Accreditation 
Accreditation is ideally suited to signal quality because accreditation of 
a residential drug treatment center would mean that the treatment center 
meets a rigorous set of standards that are focused on quality of services and 
 
information, reviewing all the possible outcomes, reviewing all their relevant values, and 
deciding which choice best promotes their preferences. These assumptions so poorly describe 
how human beings live that mandated disclosure cannot reliably improve people’s decisions 
and thus cannot be a dependable regulatory mechanism. 
Id. at 705. 
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397. Id. at 713–14. Consumer protection laws are not, however, enacted to ensure that consumers 
have perfect information or that their decisions are perfectly rational. Id. at 717. 
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evidence-based practices.400 “A traditional rationale for accreditation (and 
professional self-regulation in general) is that it promotes competition by 
providing information about quality to a market where such information is 
usually unavailable, thereby helping consumers make informed decisions 
and instilling market confidence in the services offered.”401  
Accreditation serves two critical tasks. First, it sets quality standards. 
Second, it ascertains organizational compliance with the standards and 
determines whether accreditation should be awarded.402 One prominent 
example of private accreditation in the health care field involves hospital 
accreditation. The Joint Commission has played a significant role in 
certifying hospitals for participation in Medicare and Medicaid. “When 
Congress enacted Medicare in 1965 it required hospitals to meet minimum 
health and safety requirements for participation in the program . . . and 
looked to private accreditation as a quality assurance tool.”403 Thus, when 
the Joint Commission accredits a hospital, it is deemed to be in compliance 
with Medicare’s conditions of participation.404 In developing quality 
standards, the Joint Commission seeks input from “health care 
professionals, providers, subject matter experts, consumers, and 
government agencies (including the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services).”405 There are more than 250 standards that are regularly updated 
 
400. See, e.g., Kinney, supra note 398, at 49 (“The basic purpose of accreditation is to establish 
that an organization has met and continues to meet specified standards. Accreditation serves as an 
assurance of quality for consumers of the organization’s services.”). 
401. Marina Lao, Discrediting Accreditation?: Antitrust and Legal Education, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1035, 1079 (2002). 
402. Kinney, supra note 398, at 49. 
403. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 610 (2000). 
404. Id. at 610–11. The process has been described this way: 
 Health facility accreditation is a systematic, multidisciplinary inspection of the physical 
and organizational structure of the facility or program and the functioning of its component 
parts. Factors measured include staff qualifications, facilities, organization, record keeping, and 
continuing education of staff. 
 The process of accreditation requires a request for accreditation from the board of 
governors of the hospital or health facility, implying acceptance of the standards of the 
commission. The accreditation process includes a self-assessment, an on-site survey, and 
follow-up action for correction of deficits and improvements. The commission is invited to 
conduct a survey, and resurvey as it sees fit. The hospital pays a fee and commits itself to 
provide all data requested and to cooperate with the site visit. The commission issues a 
confidential report, giving the accreditation rating and interim statement of deficiencies, and 
requests progress reports in correcting deficiencies. It is also empowered to carry out follow-
up inspections and resurveys. 
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to reflect advances in health care and medicine.406 The Joint Commission 
visits accredited hospitals once every three years to perform an accreditation 
survey to evaluate compliance.407 In addition, the Joint Commission issues 
Quality Reports on all of its accredited health care organizations and makes 
them available online.408 
The federal government could use hospital accreditation as an example 
to follow in creating an accreditation program for drug rehabilitation 
facilities. The federal government need not take on the difficult task of 
setting standards and determining compliance itself. Instead, it could use 
private standard setting and accreditation bodies to fulfill this crucial task. 
One possibility is to work with the American Society of Addiction Medicine 
(ASAM), which has developed criteria for the operation of residential drug 
treatment centers, and the Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation 
Facilities (CARF) to create an accreditation process for drug rehabilitation 
facilities. The ASAM Criteria sets guidelines for the “placement, continued 
stay, and transfer/discharge of patients with addiction and co-occurring 
conditions” and is required in more than thirty states.409 Although the 
ASAM Criteria are required in more than thirty states, there is no body 
 
406. Joint Commission FAQs, JOINT COMMISSION, https://www.jointcommission.org/about-us/fa 
cts-about-the-joint-commission/joint-commission-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/H8D4-VT6W] (“The hospital 
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407. Id.  
During the survey, surveyors select patients randomly and use their medical records as a 
roadmap to evaluate standards compliance. As surveyors trace a patient’s experience in a health 
care organization, they talk to the doctors, nurses, and other staff who interacted with the 
patient. Surveyors also observe doctors and nurses providing care, and often speak to the 
patients themselves. 
Id. 
408. Id.  
409. Am. Soc’y of Addiction Med., ASAM and CARF Reshape Addiction Care with Landmark 
Treatment Delivery Certification, CARF INT’L (Oct. 15, 2018, 5:30 AM), http://carf.org/LOC-
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Addiction treatment programs use the criteria to conduct a multi-dimensional patient 
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biopsychosocial assessment of an individual. This assessment is used for service planning and 
treatment across all services and levels of care.  
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charged with ensuring compliance with the ASAM Criteria. ASAM and 
CARF are partnering on a pilot program to provide ASAM Level of Care 
Certification to drug rehabilitation facilities that comply with the ASAM 
Criteria.410 
In addition to certification of compliance with the ASAM Criteria, it 
would also be important to ensure that providers are using evidence-based 
treatment as the foundation of their drug rehabilitation programs. The 
weakness in the ASAM Criteria is that it focuses on the process of care by 
looking at the frequency of clinical treatment within the facility.411 Standing 
alone, a process-oriented measure will not guarantee quality care. Ideally, 
any accreditation process would examine both the process and type of care 
provided.  
Some may argue that setting federal accreditation standards would 
prevent states from acting as laboratories of experimentation and 
developing their own requirements for residential drug treatment centers 
because it would standardize care.412 While important, this argument carries 
less weight in the face of a nationwide opioid crisis. Vulnerable patients 
need to be protected as they seek treatment for SUD. In addition, the 
accreditation requirements would simply set minimum standards for 
residential drug treatment centers. States could impose more restrictive 
requirements for residential drug treatment centers in their respective states. 
Finally, by requiring minimum standards, disreputable treatment centers 
will not be able to move from state to state to defraud consumers. 
There are likely to be significant costs associated with accreditation. If 
accreditation is mandatory, there may be some rehabilitation facilities that 
are unable to afford compliance with the accreditation standards. This could 
be because the cost of applying for accreditation is high or because the 
facility would need to undergo significant changes to meet the accreditation 
standards. Either way, some facilities may be forced to leave the market. It 
is certainly possible that there will be some quality facilities that will close 
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411. See NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., supra note 242, 
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quality of a specific health care service delivered, including co-occurring conditions, patient compliance 
and lifestyle. Outcome data also are subjective and vary according to the setting and the particular 
instruments used to measure them. Given these barriers, quality assurance efforts tend to focus on the 
process of care, which examines the frequency with which interventions known to correlate with positive 
outcomes are performed.”).  














their doors. Although that would be an unfortunate outcome, it does not 
outweigh the risk that disreputable facilities will flourish in the absence of 
government intervention.  
B. Licensing 
Licensing standards go hand in hand with accreditation, especially in the 
medical context. In order for drug rehabilitation treatment facilities to 
provide care that meets the standards of medical practice, those who provide 
care will need training in addiction treatment and specialized education. 
Without training and education requirements, it is unlikely that treatment 
facilities will utilize evidence-based treatment. Further, the federal 
government should mandate that the professionals who treat patients with 
SUD should be treated the same as other medical professionals in the state.  
Licensure laws are often justified as a means to protect the public from 
service providers without expertise in the given field. Thus, only those 
individuals who have met the education and training requirements for their 
field may obtain licenses.413 In the medical profession, licensure laws play 
a prominent role and have been consistently upheld when challenged in 
court.414  
In addition, licensure laws are well-suited to address the quality of care 
at residential drug treatment facilities. As Kristin Madison has explained in 
the context of medical professional licensing:  
State licensure frameworks protect ill-informed patients against poor 
quality care in two ways. First, state statutes impose minimum 
licensure qualifications to practice medicine and prohibit the 
unauthorized practice of medicine. The licensure requirement works 
prospectively to protect patients against poor quality care: if the 
prohibition against unauthorized practice is enforced, patients will be 
unable to contract with providers who do not fulfill licensure 
requirements. The prohibition prevents uninformed patients from 
mistakenly selecting unqualified practitioners they would have 
avoided, had they been more informed. Properly designed licensure 
requirements will prevent those most likely to deliver poor quality 
care from providing services to patients.  
 Second, state statutes create professional oversight boards 
responsible not only for overseeing the licensure process, but also for 
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414. Id. at 600–03 (explaining the history of challenges to medical licensure). 












disciplining licensed professionals for unprofessional conduct and 
incompetence. This regulatory approach differs from the prohibition 
on unauthorized practice in the sense that it is retrospective; it 
responds to poor quality practice that has already occurred, rather 
than the mere probability of poor quality practice.415  
If low quality providers are eliminated through state licensing, the average 
quality of providers will increase.  
One criticism of licensing is that it limits access and can be used to 
“protect the economic interests of professionals against both potential 
outside competitors seeking entry into the profession and those within the 
group itself.”416 This is a valid concern of licensure laws in general. In this 
context, however, it is important to keep in mind the fraudulent practices 
and the poor quality of care delivered to SUD patients in the absence of 
regulation. Protecting SUD patients from incompetent providers should be 
the highest priority. It is the lack of regulation that has welcomed 
disreputable providers into the market. Thus, the focus needs to be on 
raising the standards to ensure a minimum level of quality across the board. 
Further, addiction is a brain disease for which there are evidence-based 
treatments available. There is no reason to exclude the professionals 
providing care from the stringent qualifications that apply to other medical 
professionals.  
CONCLUSION 
The United States is in the midst of an opioid crisis and people are 
relapsing, committing drug-related crimes, and dying after receiving poor 
care at disreputable residential drug rehabilitation facilities and sober living 
homes. Patients often lack critical information about what quality drug 
rehabilitation looks like, how to find it, and whether they are receiving it. 
As the demand for residential drug rehabilitation increases, these problems 
will only be further pronounced without government action. Although 
EKRA was an excellent first step in dealing with corruption at disreputable 
drug rehabilitation centers and sober living homes, there are serious 
questions about the reach of the statute. Further, there is still additional work 
to be done to ensure quality care. Public and private insurers need to 
incentivize providers to provide quality care. One way to properly 
incentivize providers is to change from a fee-for-service reimbursement 
model to a value-based reimbursement model because reimbursement will 
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be tied to positive outcomes rather than the number of urine tests performed. 
Finally, to ensure quality care, the federal government needs to establish 
mandatory accreditation and licensing standards that require evidence-
based treatment at facilities treating substance use disorder. All of these 
policy changes are necessary to protect those impacted by the opioid crisis 
who are bravely seeking treatment. 
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